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California Supreme Court Survey
July 1997 - December 1997
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the
supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of issues that the supreme court has
addressed, as well as to serve as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney
discipline, judicial misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
Summaries provide a briefoutline of the areas of law addressed in selected California Supreme
Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the legal
implications of cases in a concise format.

I. BUILDING REGULATION
The Permit Streamlining Act supports the common law doctrine of waiver for
its statutory time limit given to an agency to approve or disapprove a
completed application if the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
174
Bickel v. City of Piedmont ...................................

II. CRIMINAL LAW
A.

The use of the term "may" by the legislature in drafting Penal Code section
12022.5(d) was not intended to confer discretion upon trial judges in applying
the penalty enhancement for use of a firearm in a crime, but rather confers
authorization to impose the enhancement when otherwise precluded, and thus
the enhancement is mandatory when the underlying offense is assault with a
firearm.
178
People v. Ledesma . ........................................

B.

A pinpoint instruction given by the court, directing a jury to consider a
defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether the defendant
possessed the requisite mental state or specific intentfor afirst-degree murder
conviction, was not misleading when the instruction did not inform the jury
that premeditation was a mental state. A reasonable jury understands
deliberation and premeditation to be a mental state, a condition from which
the jury could weigh evidence of voluntary intoxication.
183
People v. Castillo . .........................................

169

C.

An assailant'suse of hands orfeet to commit an assault does not constitute an
attack "with a deadly weapon" pursuant to California Penal Code section
245(a)(1). However, because such an attack is analyzed by a jury in the same
way as an assault "likely to produce great bodily injury" under the same
section, a prosecutor's erroneous claim during closing arguments that the
defendant's kicks and punches were an assault with a deadly weapon under
section 245(a)(1) was harmless error.
People v. A guilar . ......................................... 189

D.

Under three strikes law, consecutive sentences are not mandatory in sentencing a defendant who is a priorfelony offender, and who is convicted of
multiple current felony offenses, if those multiple current felonies were
committed on the same occasion,or arisefrom the same set of operativefacts.
People v. H endrix .......................................... 193

E.

State and federal double jeopardy clauses and the "hallmarks of the trial"
analysis do not apply to a noncapitalproceeding to determine the truth of a
prior seriousfelony. Sentencing proceedingsthat have "the hallmarks of the
trial on guilt or innocence" are not barredby the double jeopardy clauses.
People v. Angel Jaime Monge ................................ 197

F.

California'snew three strikes law, CaliforniaPenal Code § 1170.12, states
that recidivistfelons are to receive a separatedeterminate term for sentence
enhancements imposed pursuant to California Penal Code § 667(a), even
though those same enhancements were used in the calculationof the felons'
indeterminate life terms imposed pursuant to California Penal Code §
1170.12. The separate determinateterm and the indeterminatelife term are
to run consecutively.
People v. Dotson ........................................... 203

mR.

DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITIONS
The term "answer" in the Code of Civil Procedure section 2025(o) includes
nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a videotapeddeposition; therefore,
if a deponent refuses to comply with an orderrequiringa re-enactment of an
event at a videotaped deposition, he or she may be subject to discovery
sanctions.
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Superior Court.......................... 208

170
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IV. EMINENT DOMAIN
A landowner'sentitlement to severancedamagesin an eminent domain action
is not limited to "special" benefits, and it is necessary for the fact finder to
take into considerationany evidence relevant to circumstancescreated by the
project that would affect the fairmarket value of the land not taken as long as
such evidence is not theoretical nor uncertain.
Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Continental Dev. Corp. 212
V. ENVIRONMENT
As a certified regulatoryprogram,the Fish and Game Commission is entitled
to an exemption from the Environmental Impact Report process of the
California Environmental Quality Act in delisting a species from the
endangeredor threatenedspecies list, even though the CaliforniaEndangered
Species Act was enacted after the Fish and Game Commission received its
certification.
218
Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish and Game Comm'n..............

VI. INSURANCE
An insurermust defend an entireclaim even ifa portionof the claims asserted
arepotentially covered. An insurermay seek reimbursementfrom the insured
for defense costs for claims that are not potentially covered by the insurance
policy. The insurerbears this burden ofproofandmust show by apreponderance of the evidence that the claims were not potentially covered.
223
Buss v. Superior Court. ....................................
VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A property owner need not forfeit all of his property to properly maintainan
actionfor inverse condemnationfollowing a due process violation, though the
remedy, if availableand adequate, obviates afinding of a taking.
228
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd ...................

171

VIII. MONOPOLIES AND RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
Business & Professions Code, section 16750 gives counties and other
governmental entities the authority to bring and prosecute Cartwright Act
antitrust actions. Furthermore,the legislature,through Government Code,
sections 23000 and 23004(a) gave counties the same powers as corporations,
andthus can seek damages infederal courtfor injuries incurredfrom antitrust
violations.
Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. County of Stanislaus ................ 233

IX. NEGLIGENCE
A participantin an active sportowes a duty to fellow participantsnot to injure
them intentionallyor to actrecklessly; even ifa local ordinancecouldheighten
the duty of care establishedby common law, a county safety ordinancewhich
encompasses the common law assumption of risk doctrine does not modify the
general test for breach of legal duty by a participantin an active sport.
Cheong v. Antablin . ....................................... 238
X. PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
County board of retirementmust recalculatefinal compensationfor pension
purposes under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937. In addition
to base salary,final compensation includes thefollowing: longevity incentive
bonuses, cash in lieu of accrued vacation, bilingual premium pay, pay for
employees acting as field training officers and educational incentive pay.
Compensation earnablefor the purposes of final compensation does not
include overtime pay or county contributionsto deferredcompensationplans;
Ventura County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Board of Retirement of Ventura
County Employee's Retirement Ass'n ....................... 243

XI. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In a case involving asbestos-relatedcancer,aplaintiffmay prove causationby
proving that, within a reasonablemedical probability,the asbestos manufactured by the defendant was a substantialfactor contributingto the plaintiff's
risk of developing cancer. Furthermore, a burden shifting jury instruction,
shifting the burden ofproof to the defendant manufacturer,is unnecessary in
complex asbestos litigation absent a showing of necessityfor applicationof
alternative liability.
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc............................. 248
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XII. TORTS
For purposes of prospectively apply Proposition51, a cause of action for
damages resultingfrom a latentor progressivediseaseaccrues at the time of
diagnosisor discovery of the disease.
Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp ....................
253

XIH. TRUSTS
The power to assert the attorney-clientprivilege with respect to confidential
communications between a predecessor trustee and its attorney on matters
concerning trust administrationpasses from the predecessor trustee to its
successor upon the successor'sassumption of the office of trustee.
Moeller v. Superior Court ..................................
257

I. BUILDING REGULATION
The Permit Streamlining Act supports the common law doctrine of waiver for
its statutory time limit given to an agency to approve or disapprove a completed
application if the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Bickel v. City of Piedmont, Supreme Court of California, Decided November 20,
1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1040, 946 P.2d 427, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758.

Facts. The plaintiffs applied to the City of Piedmont Planning Commission on
March 7, 1991, for approval of their proposed second-story addition to their home.
The planning Commission then scheduled a public hearing for the matter for April
8, 1991. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs realized that their neighbors were voicing
concerns over the proposal. The plaintiffs then asked that the scheduled hearing
be taken off the Planning Commission's schedule, which the Planning Commission
did and continued the hearing for six months. During this six-month period, the
plaintiffs did not resubmit their remodeling application nor did they ask for a
rescheduled public hearing.
The plaintiffs submitted a revised proposal and request for approval of their
second-story addition to the Planning Commission on March 12, 1992. The
Planning Commission, on April 11, deemed the application complete. After a
public hearing on April 13 in which neighbors raised concerns over the addition
to the plaintiffs' home, the plaintiffs asked for a continuance to revise their plan.
The Planning Commission granted the continuance and, after other revisions by the
plaintiffs to their proposal, set a public hearing for November 9. At that public
hearing, the Planning Commission and the plaintiffs agreed to another three-month
extension. The plaintiffs gave revised plans again on January 12, 1993, and
following a February 8 hearing, the Planning Commission denied approval.
The plaintiffs then appealed to the Piedmont City Council arguing that the
completed application of April 11, 1992 was approved by the Planning Commission's failure to act within statutory time limits. The Permit Streamlining Act
provided for approval of a completed application if a government agency did not
act to approve or disapprove within six months, or to an additional ninety days if
the city and applicant mutually agreed to the extension. The City Council denied
the appeal, after which the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate from the Alameda
County Superior Court. The Superior Court denied the writ because of waiver and
estoppel. The court of appeal reversed, claiming waiver did not apply to the Act.
The California Supreme Court then granted review.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, focusing on
the question of whether application of the common law doctrine of waiver is
prohibited by either the Act's purpose or its statutory language. The court held that

174
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the Permit Streamlining Act did not prohibit an applicant from waiving the
statutory time limits of agency action and that, in fact, the plaintiffs did waive the
statutory time limit.
The court noted that in Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926 P.2d
438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (1996), a criminal defendant could waive the benefit of
the statute of limitations of a lesser crime. Statutes of limitations are used partly
for the benefit of the defendant, and thus a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver is valid. Likewise, the time limits provided in the Permit Streamlining Act
are partly used as a benefit to the applicant. If the waiver is done knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, then the waiver should be valid. The court also stated
that the court of appeal's apprehension over coerced waivers by agencies would
not become a problem because a waiver must be voluntary. If an agency forces a
waiver from an applicant, then the resulting waiver would not be valid.
Having decided that a waiver is permissible, the court then looked to whether
the facts in the instant case supported a finding of waiver. The plaintiffs must have
had an existing right, knowledge of that right, and an actual intention to relinquish
the right. The court noted that the plaintiffs agreed to a three-month continuance
at the November 9, 1992 hearing, and that after the hearing the plaintiffs did not
resubmit a revised proposal until after the statutory time limit. Therefore, the court
found evidence that the plaintiffs made a waiver and the trial court's decision was
reinstated.
REFERENCES
Statutes:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 1995) (stating that anyone may waive the advantage
of a law intended solely for his benefit).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65920 (West 1995) (establishing time limits for agencies to

act in either approving or disapproving a land-use application).
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65950 (West 1995) (specifying six months as the period of

time for an agency to act).
Case Law:
City of Ukiah v. Fones, 64 Cal. 2d 104, 410 P.2d 369, 48 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1966)
(stating a waiver must be shown through an existing right, knowledge of the right,
and an actual intention to give up that right).

Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926 P.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458
(1996) (holding that a criminal defendant may waive the statute of limitations to
a lesser crime).
Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal. 2d 427,45 P.2d 183 (1935) (holding that
an appellate court must look to substantial evidence to support findings below).
Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1982) (holding that the existence of a waiver is a question of fact).
People v. Trejo, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 266 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1990) (holding a
defendant may waive the constitutional right to a jury of 12 persons).
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (defining waiver as the intentional
relinquishment of a known right).
Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1,900 P.2d 619, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
370 (1995) (stating a waiver may be expressed or implied).
Legal Texts:
30 CAL. JUR. 3d Estoppel and Waiver § 1 (1987) (discussing the definitions of
waiver and estoppel).
66 CAL. JUR. 3d Zoning and Other Land Controls § 191.5 (1987) (discussing the
limitations of permits for residential construction).
4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Prop § 53 (9th ed. 1987)
(discussing generally land use in California).
11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY
(defining waiver).

OF CALIFORNIA LAW,

Equity § 178 (9th ed. 1990)

Law Review and Journal Articles:
Barbara Clark, Comment, An ExpandedRole for the State in Regional Land Use
Control,70 CAL. L. Rv. 151 (1982) (discussing state intervention in local land use
issues).
Maxwell M. Freeman & Elizabeth Freeman Gurev, An Overview of Defenses
Available to Guarantorsof Real Property,38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 329 (1998)
(discussing waiver as a defense).
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Steven A. Greenburg, Learning Disabled Juveniles & Miranda Rights-What
Constitutes Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 487 (1991) (discussing what a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver is).
Merritt, The PermitStreamliningAct: The Dream andReality, 1LAND USE FORUM
30 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the Act).
Jonathon Smith & Alan Pendleton, San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission: Challengeand Response After 30 Years, 28 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 269 (1998) (discussing ways to streamline the permit application
process).
Kenneth Wilson, Down Stream from Streamlining, 7 CAL. LAW. 67 (1987)
(discussing the creation of the Permit Streamlining Act).

TODD DOMJAN

II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. The use of the term "may" by the legislature in drafting Penal Code section
12022.5(d) was not intended to confer discretion upon trial judges in
applying the penalty enhancement for use of a firearm in a crime, but
rather confers authorization to impose the enhancement when otherwise
precluded, and thus the enhancement is mandatory when the underlying
offense is assault with a firearm.
People v. Ledesma, Supreme Court of California,Decided July 31, 1997, 16 Cal.
4th 90, 939 P.2d 1310, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322.

Facts. California Penal Code section 12022.5 requires the imposition of a penalty
enhancement for the personal use of a firearm in a crime. Section 12022.5(a)
makes the enhancement mandatory, but prohibits the imposition of the enhancement when use of a firearm is an element of the offense. However, section
12022.5(d) removes this prohibition by stating that the penalty enhancement "may"
be imposed in cases of assault with a firearm or assault with a deadly weapon
pursuant to section 245, or when the defendant has discharged a firearm from a
moving vehicle in an attempt to cause great bodily injury.
The defendant was convicted of several offenses including assault with a
firearm under Penal Code section 245(a)(2). At sentencing, the trial judge imposed
the section 12022.5 penalty enhancement without stating reasons on the record.
The defendant appealed, contending that the imposition of the enhancement was
discretionary, and the trial judge's failure to give reasons for his discretionary
imposition of the penalty enhancement constituted reversible error.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court and rejected the defendant's
argument that imposition of the penalty enhancement was discretionary. The court
of appeal held that imposition of the enhancement for defendants convicted of
assault with a firearm was mandatory, and therefore, the trial judge was not
required to give reasons for imposing the sentence enhancement. The California
Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the use of the word "may" in
section 12022.5(d) was intended by the legislature to confer discretion upon judges
to impose the penalty enhancement for assault with a firearm.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the use of the word "may" by the legislature in section 12022.5(d)
was not intended to confer discretion upon judges in applying the penalty
enhancement for violations of section 245. Rather, the court held that the use of
the word "may" was intended to show that the penalty enhancement was authorized
when otherwise precluded by other language in section 12022.5.
In holding that the use of "may" was not a grant of discretion, the supreme
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court rejected the defendant's argument, which relied on prior holdings that
recognized the rule that the use of "may" in statutory language denoted a
discretionary provision, while the use of "shall" denoted a mandatory provision.
In rejecting the "shall/may" dichotomy in making its determination of the
legislative intent behind section 12022.5, the supreme court recognized that besides
the plain language of the statute, an examination of the intent beyond mere verbage
to "the spirit of the act" must be undertaken to determine legislative intent. In
following this line of reasoning, the court set out to examine section 12022.5(d) in
context with related provisions and statutes.
In examining the plain language itself, the court noted that "may" is afforded
many definitions and indicates authorization as well as permissiveness. Examining
the statute in the context of related statutes, the court noted that section 12022.5
was specifically deleted by the legislature from section 1170.1, the statute allowing
judges to strike firearm use allegations that would result in a penalty enhancement.
The court reasoned that by removing the ability of trial judges to strike firearm use
enhancements, the legislature had imposed a restraint indistinguishable from
requiring the trial judge to impose the enhancement mandatorily. Because the
legislature had done this, the court concluded that it was an indication that the
legislature intended the firearm use enhancement to be mandatory.
The supreme court buttressed its reasoning with an examination of the history
of section 12022.5, which revealed that subdivision (d) of the section grew out of
an earlier unified statute that had no subdivisions. The court also noted that
subdivision (d) was a subsequent response to subdivision (a), which disallows the
firearm use enhancement when use of a firearm is an underlying element of the
crime. The court concluded that the term "may" in subdivision (d) was intended
by the legislature to create an exception to the prohibition in subdivision (a), not
an indication of a grant of discretion. The supreme court also noted that in a
revision of the statute, no attempt by the legislature was made to alter a prior court
ruling making the enhancement mandatory.
Because the plain language suggesting discretion in imposing the sentence
enhancement conflicted with the legislative history and contextual application of
the statute, the supreme court concluded that the legislative intent of section
12022.5(d) called for mandatory imposition of penalty enhancements when
defendants are convicted of assault with a firearm, of assault with a deadly weapon,
or of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with intent to cause great bodily
harm.

REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENALCODE § 245 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (defining the base punishment

for assault with a firearm or assault with a deadly weapon).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (h) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998) (a court may strike the
allegations of a conviction that support a sentence enhancement if the court finds
mitigating factors).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(d) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (a sentence enhancement imposed for use of a firearm in the commission of a crime is not prohibited
from being imposed on defendants convicted of assault with a firearm, of assault
with a deadly weapon, or of discharging a firearm from a moving vehicle with the
intent to cause bodily harm).
Case Law:
People v. Campbell, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340 (1995),
overturnedby People v. Ledesma, 16 Cal. 4th 90,939 P.2d 1310, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
322 (1997) (use of the term "may" by the legislature was a grant of discretion to
the court in imposing section 12022.5 penalty enhancements).
People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554, 715 P.2d 585, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1986) (the use
of the word "may" and "shall" in section 667.6 shows an intent by the legislature
to grant discretion by use of the word "may" and to make mandatory by use of the
word "shall").
People v. Hill, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1574, 255 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1989) (mandatory
imposition of a penalty enhancement requires no statement of reasons by the trial
court).
People v. Lopez, 21 Cal. App. 4th 225, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 25 (1993) (trial court
erred in striking a firearm use allegation from a conviction because the legislature
had specifically deleted section 12022.5, the statute prescribing enhancement for
firearm use, from section 1170. 1(h), the statute listing crimes in which the judge
has discretion to strike the penalty enhancement).
People v. White, 16 Cal. 3d 791,549 P.2d 537, 129 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1976) (holding
that the intent of the legislature in prescribing a penalty enhancement under section
12022.5 was to deter the use of firearms in violent crimes).
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Legal Texts:
22 CAL. JuR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3362 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
when penalty enhancements are appropriate).
22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3399 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
the guidelines a judge must follow in imposing a sentence).
22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3402 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
requirement under Penal Code section 1170(c) that a judge must state his reasons
for imposing a discretionary sentence).
22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3410 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the rule
that enhancements must be imposed unless the court finds that mitigating
circumstances exist and preclusion of the enhancements by mitigating circumstances is authorized by the legislature).
3 B.E. WrrIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment

for Crimes § 1473 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing penalty
enhancements).
3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment

for Crimes §§ 1500-1501 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the rationale
behind enhancements and their specific application under sections 12022-12022.5).
6 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Judgmentand

Attack in Trial Court § 3112 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the
discretion a trial judge has to impose consecutive sentences and specifically
discussing the discretion a trial judge has to strike a penalty enhancement).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretationas Practical
Reasoning,42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (generally discussing methods ofjudicial
interpretation of the language of a statute to determine legislative intent in drafting
the statute).

Edward H. Gaylord, An Approach to Statutory Construction,5 Sw. U. L. REV. 349
(1973) (generally discussing statutory construction and specifically discussing the
interpretation of the meaning of the words "may" and "shall" in their context within
statutory language).
Paula A. Johnson, Senate Bill 42: The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 133 (1977) (discussing the impact of the passage of the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1977, which transferred discretion in
sentencing from a gubernatorial-appointed board to the trial judge).
Maurice H. Oppenheim, Computing a Determinate Sentence: New Math Hits the
Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 605 (1976) (discussing the impact of the passage of the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1977, which transferred discretion in
sentencing from a gubernatorial-appointed board to the trial judge).
Anthony M. Perez & Tammy L. Samsel, Note, Review ofSelected 1993 California
Legislation Crimes, 25 PAC. L.J. 513 (1994) (discussing the possible penalty
enhancements for assault with a firearm or assault with a deadly weapon under
section 12022.5 as amended by the passage of Chapter 611 in the 1993 legislative
session).

JOSHUA DALE
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B.

A pinpoint instruction given by the court, directing a jury to consider a
defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether the defendant
possessed the requisite mental state or specific intent for a first-degree
murder conviction, was not misleading when the instruction did not inform
the jury that premeditation was a mental state. A reasonable jury
understands deliberation and premeditation to be a mental state, a
condition from which the jury could weigh evidence of voluntary intoxication.

People v. Castillo, Supreme Court of California,Decided November 13, 1997, 16
Cal. 4th 1009, 945 P.2d 1197, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648.

Facts. On October 2, 1992, the defendant, Adam Castillo, was a passenger in a car
containing four other members of Castillo's "Juares Maravilla" gang. The group
drove to the defendant's home and waited outside while Castillo retrieved a sawedoff shotgun. Castillo emerged from the home carrying the shotgun, wrapped in a
towel, and the gang resumed driving. At Castillo's request, the group stopped at
an intersection where three men were standing. Rickey Garcia and Sergio Cortez,
members of the "Tiny Boys" gang, were two of these men. Castillo then asked
Garcia "where he was from." Garcia responded with "Tiny Boys." Upon hearing
this, Castillo immediately got out of the car and shot Cortez in the chest with a
small hand gun, shouting "Juares." Cortez, who survived the shooting, and the two
other men, ran from the scene. Castillo then returned to the car, retrieved the
shotgun, chased down Garcia, and fatally shot him in the head. One of Castillo's
fellow gang members testified that Castillo did not appear intoxicated at the time.
When first arrested, Castillo told an officer that he had nothing to do with the
crime. However, Castillo later changed that testimony when told that witnesses
had identified him as the shooter. It was at this point that Castillo revealed that he
had smoked one and one-half phencyclidine (PCP) cigarettes on the night in
question. As a result of Castillo's intoxication, Castillo reported that he felt dizzy,
was unable to stand, and that his heart beat rapidly throughout the night.
Furthermore, at trial Castillo testified that he was only able to recall selected
portions of the night in controversy due to the PCP use. Castillo remembered
riding in the car, getting out of the car after hearing "Tiny Boys," and everything
seemed to move in "slow motion." Castillo stated that the PCP use affected his
mental state.
Castillo was charged with the murder of Garcia and the premeditated murder
of Cortez. The jury was instructed on first and second degree murder, as well as
involuntary manslaughter regarding the Garcia murder. The theory behind the first
degree murder charge was premeditation and deliberation. In reference to the

Cortez shooting, the jury was instructed on attempted murder and assault with a
firearm. Castillo was convicted of first degree murder of Garcia and assault with
a firearm of Cortez.
Castillo appealed this decision and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The court of appeal reversed the conviction for first degree murder and affirmed
the conviction for assault with a firearm. As a result, the writ was deemed moot.
The court reasoned that Castillo's defense counsel had performed ineffectively
because counsel did not request a jury instruction specifically relating voluntary
intoxication to the premeditation and deliberation necessary to establish a
conviction of first degree murder. The court found that Castillo's counsel erred
when it did not request a pinpoint instruction stating that premeditation is a mental
state. The court determined that Castillo was convicted of the first degree murder
charge as an unbroken result of defense counsel's errors.
Underlying these findings was the court of appeal's determination that the trial
court's sua spontejury instructions regarding Castillo's voluntary intoxication were
misleading toward the "conscientious juror." As such, they were deemed
inadequate. The trial court instructed the jury to consider Castillo's voluntary
intoxication in determining whether Castillo had the required specific mental state
or intent for first degree murder. However, the court of appeal reasoned that the
instructions, as given, caused the jury to believe that it could consider the evidence
of voluntary intoxication on the issue of intent to kill, but not on the question of
premeditation.
Specifically, the court of appeal stated that the instructions were misleading
because, "when the first sentence of... CALJIC No. 4.21 that was read to the jury
referred to 'the specific intent to kill' and was completely silent as to the mental
state, a conscientious juror would have understood it to pertain to the charge of
attempted murder, and not... premeditation." The court of appeal found that a
reading of CALJIC 4.21.1 not only did nothing to clear up the confusion, but
actually made the confusion worse. The court stated that "a juror listening... to
an 'exception' to the rule that intoxication is not an excuse and the admonition to
refer to the other instructions would have understood the exception to apply to only
'the specific intent to kill' portion of CALJIC 4.21." The Supreme Court of
California granted the Attorney General's petition for review.
Holding. Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the two
prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
defendant, in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, must show not only
that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the counsel's errors
negatively affected the ultimate outcome for his client. Furthermore, the California
case of People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112
(1986), dictates that "the correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from
the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or
from a particular instruction .... The absence of an essential element in one
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instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a
whole."
Applying Strickland to the case at bar, the Supreme Court of California ruled
that because the trial court issued an overall adequate sua sponte jury instruction
regarding Castillo's voluntary intoxication, defense counsel did not err in failing
to request a superfluous pinpoint instruction linking premeditation as a mental
state. The court reasoned that the trial court fully informed the jury of the
applicable law, releasing defense counsel from the obligation of requesting
"additional explanatory instructions." From the record, the court found sufficient
evidence that competent counsel could reasonably conclude that the instructions
given were satisfactory. Hence, the Supreme Court of California determined that
neither prong of the Strickland test was violated.
Similarly, the court ruled that the Burgener standard was not offended. The
court recognized that the trial court "might have adopted the first paragraph of
CALJIC No. 4.21 to refer to both the specific intent necessary for first degree
murder and the additional mental state necessary for first degree murder."
However, the court reasoned that the nonperformance of this sort of modification
did not mislead the jury, especially given the detailed explications of the
instructions that were given, and particularly when the instructions are considered
as a collection.
The court found that the trial court's instructions sufficiently related
intoxication to mental state, and the instructions inexorably guided the jury's
attention toward voluntary intoxication's link with premeditation and deliberation.
At the crux of this analysis, the supreme court reasoned that "premeditation and
deliberation are clearly mental states" and "no reasonable juror would assume
otherwise." As such, the court determined that it was not "reasonably likely" that
Castillo's PCP use was disregarded by the jury in deciding the degree of the Garcia
murder. Moreover, defense counsel argued profusely throughout the course of the
trial that the defendant's intoxication affected his mental state, including
premeditation, on the night in question.
Castillo also argued that the verdicts themselves were evidence that the jury
was confused about its instructions. Castillo pointed to the fact that while he was
convicted of first degree murder for the Garcia murder, he was only convicted of
assault with a firearm for shooting Cortez. Castillo believed that this apparent
discrepancy was due to the fact that the jury considered Castillo's voluntary
intoxication defense only in respect of the Cortez shooting, not in regard to the first
degree murder of Garcia.
However, the court reconciled the jury's apparent discrepancy by highlighting
specific merits of the case and linking these particular facts with a reasonable
finding of premeditation by the jury for the Garcia murder, but not for the Cortez

shooting. Castillo's added effort and the time span between the Cortez shooting
and the Garcia murder was key to this analysis. The court reasoned that the time
that elapsed while Castillo returned to the car, retrieved the shotgun, and chased
Garcia, could easily have led the jury to conclude that Castillo was able to
premeditate the Garcia murder, while the spontaneity surrounding the Cortez
shooting did not allow for such reflection and deliberation.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (Deering 1985 & Supp. 1998) (stating that evidence of

voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether a defendant has
formed the requisite specific intent, premeditation, and/or deliberation required to
commit a crime).
CALJIC 4.21, 4.21.1 (jury instructions for affecting California Penal Code §
22(b)).
Case Law:
People v. Reyes, 52 Cal. App. 4th 975, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (1997) (concluding that
evidence of voluntary intoxication can be used to rebut the assertion that the
defendant possessed a particular mental state necessary to commit a crime).
People v. Aguirre, 31 Cal. App. 4th 391, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (1995) (concluding
that a reading of CALJIC 4.21.1 was not misleading toward the jury, nor
prejudicial toward the accused, because the instruction was adequately and fully
explained to the jury before deliberation).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (announcing the standard by which
a defendant must prove ineffective assistance of counsel).
People v. Tello, 15 Cal. 4th 264, 933 P.2d 1134, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (1997)
(ruling that if the record fails to reveal why counsel acted or failed to act in the
challenged manner, the claim on appeal must fail, unless there is no satisfactory
explanation for counsel's performance).
People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986)
(holding that the correctness of jury instructions is to be determined by an analysis
of the set of instructions as a whole).
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Legal Texts:
17 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 86 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the
distinction between general and specific intent crimes and the notion that evidence
of intoxication is admissible solely to negate an element of a crime such as mental
state).
20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2298 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
general rule that evidence of voluntary intoxication does not render one less
capable of committing a crime; also, discussing the trial court's use of CALJIC No.
4.21.1 and the instruction's exception to the general rule of culpability despite
voluntary intoxication. Such a reading is comprehendible by the jury and is not
prejudicial toward the accused).
3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Form and
Style, General Principles § 2933 (2d ed. 1989) (generally discussing that
instructions should be understandable to the lay juror, avoiding undue repetition;
the fact that necessary elements are to be found in more than one instruction does
not make the overall reading prejudicial).

1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Unconscious
PersonsFrom Voluntary Intoxication§ 217 (2d ed. 1989) (tracing the development
of the law that voluntary intoxication can be used to show a lack of capacity to
form specific intent, but not as a total defense).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Miguel Angel Mendez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach To Mens
Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (1994) (explaining that vague mens rea terms
prevent judges and administrators from determining the level of accountability
required to hold individuals accountable for their crimes).
Gregg L. Prickett, Mental Defenses in California,or "Still Crazy After All These
Years," 18 W. STATE UNIv. L. REv. 71 (1990) (advocating that whenever a
defendant attempts to excuse or mitigate his conduct due to a then-existing mental
condition, the defendant should be required to present to the trier of fact a complete
mental history and explanation of his behavior).

CriminalResponsibility,21 MENTAL & PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 574 (1997) (explicating

the California Supreme Court holding that a voluntary intoxication instruction did
not diminish the significance of a defense based upon mental defect relating
specific intent to murder).
Review of Selected 1995 California Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 603 (1996)
(discussing the effect of the voluntary intoxication defense; the most likely result
is a second-degree murder conviction).
Anne Fingarette Hasse, Drug Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility: Old
Dilemmasand a New Proposal,16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 249 (1976) (advocating
the implementation of statutory crimes in which criminal conduct, performed while
voluntarily intoxicated, is treated much like criminal recklessness or gross
negligence).

GARY DEVLIN
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C.

An assailant's use of hands or feet to commit an assault does not constitute
an attack "with a deadly weapon" pursuant to California Penal Code
section 245(a)(1). However, because such an attack is analyzed by a jury
in the same way as an assault "likely to produce great bodily injury" under

the same section, a prosecutor's erroneous claim during closing arguments
that the defendant's kicks and punches were an assault with a deadly
weapon under section 245(a)(1) was harmless error.
People v. Aguilar, Supreme Court of California,Decided November 17, 1997, 16
Cal. 4th 1023, 925 P.2d 1204, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655.

Facts. On July 19, 1993, the defendant, Raymond Aguilar, and three other men
were driving through town after an evening of drinking when they saw the victim,
Donald Tenney, Jr., rollerblading nearby. The men believed Tenny to be the same
person with whom they had a verbal dispute earlier that evening, so they stopped
to confront him. Tenny denied having an earlier encounter with the men, but they
began to fight with him anyway, kicking him repeatedly and hitting him with their
fists. At some point, one of the men, Richard Perez, demanded Tenny's wallet and
watch. Tenny claimed he had no wallet, upon which the beating continued. Tenny
sustained a head wound and concussion, a broken ankle, and multiple bruises.
After about one to fourteen minutes, the four men left in their vehicle, taking
Tenny's watch. Police stopped the car after receiving a report of a fight and
potential robbery, and found the watch during a search of the vehicle. Tenny
positively identified the men as his assailants.
Aguilar was tried and convicted on charges of aggravated assault pursuant to
California Penal Code section 245(a)(1). This section prohibits assaults with "a
deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury." Basing its decision on People v. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th
1116, 847 P.2d 45, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (1993), the court of appeal overturned the
conviction on the grounds that the prosecutor erroneously instructed thejury during
his closing arguments that Aguilar's hands and feet could be considered deadly
weapons under section 245(a)(1). The California Supreme Court granted the
Attorney General's petition to decide the issue of whether section 245(a)(1)
includes hands and feet within its scope of deadly weapons.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision, holding that
the prosecutor's categorization of hands and feet as deadly weapons, although
inaccurate, did not constitute reversible error. The case was remanded for review
of the defendant's other appeals.
Section 245(a)(1) is aimed at assaults of two specific natures: (1) those which

involve the use of "a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm," and (2)
those perpetrated "by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury."
In each of these cases, the court noted, it is the potential for harm to the victim,
rather than the actual injuries inflicted, which ultimately triggers the statute.
Case law supports a conviction under section 245(a)(1) where hands and feet
alone are used with "force likely to cause serious great bodily injury." However,
the court rejected the argument that a section 245(a)(1) conviction could also stand
on the theory that the defendant's hands and feet were "deadly weapons." A
background look at the statute's history revealed that it was originally written
without the "force likely to produce" clause, and was intended to punish an
assailant who used "an object extrinsic to the body" to commit an assault. The
"force likely to produce" clause was later added for the specific purpose of
punishing brutal assaults by hands and feet within the scope of section 245(a)(1).
If the "deadly weapon or instrument" clause was interpreted to also include
assaults involving the use of hands and feet alone, the court reasoned, the "force
likely to produce" clause would become redundant. Established principles of
lawmaking disallow interpretations which render a statute redundant or superfluous. The court concluded, therefore, that the "deadly weapon" clause could not
logically be read to include hands and feet, and thus the prosecutor was in error to
suggest that hands and feet could be considered deadly weapons. The court did
acknowledge the possibility of certain types of footwear, such as steel-toed boots,
rising to the level of a "deadly weapon," but refused to rule on this basis in the
instant case because the argument was not advanced at trial.
The court held that despite the error, Aguilar's conviction should not be
reversed. It recognized the rule that where two alternate theories are presented, one
legally valid and one erroneous, and a jury is given an instruction allowing it to
base its verdict on the erroneous theory, a conviction may be overturned, unless it
can be shown "beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury did not in fact rely on the
erroneous instruction and factually deficient scenario." However, the court
determined in the instant case that the prosecutor's instruction, when taken in
context, required the jury to find that the defendant created a potential for serious
injury. Thus, the jury, if it followed the closing argument instructions, would
undergo the same analysis whether the guilty verdict was based on the "deadly
weapon" clause or on the "force likely" clause. It was therefore unnecessary for
the court to establish which of the two clauses of section 245(a)(1) the jury found
the defendant had violated, because under each of the two theories the ultimate
determination is based on the likelihood of serious bodily harm to the victim rather
than on the method by which it is rendered. The finding that hands and feet were
not deadly weapons did not result in reversible error.
Although the court's holding was favorable to the prosecution in this case, its
strong admonishment to prosecutors to use "correct nomenclature" when
addressing juries in the future suggests that similar instances of error will not be
so easily excused in the future.
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting assault
"with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm," or with a force likely
to inflict serious bodily injury).
Case Law:
Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co., 11 Cal. 4th 1049,906 P.2d 1057,48 Cal. Rptr.
2d 1 (1995) (stating that a statute should be read in a way that does not render any
part of it "superfluous" or "redundant").
People v. Harris, 9 Cal. 4th 407, 886 P.2d 1193, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1994)
(holding that jury misinstruction is harmless error where it can be shown beyond
'made no difference in
a reasonable doubt that "the erroneous instruction .
reaching the verdict obtained."').
People v. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th 1116, 847 P.2d 45, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (1993)
(acknowledging reversible error in cases where a jury, presented with both a valid
and an erroneous legal theory by the district attorney, relies solely on the invalid
theory to convict).
People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975)
(discussing the wide range of offenses potentially covered by section 245(a)(1)).
People v. Davis, 42 Cal. App. 4th 806,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (1996) (observing that
"all aggravated assaults are ultimately determined based on the force likely to be
applied against the person," rendering distinction between "assaults with deadly
weapons" and those with a likelihood of causing serious bodily harm under section
245(a)(1) unnecessary).
People v. Dozie, 224 Cal. App. 2d 474, 36 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964) (concluding that
hands and fists are not dangerous or deadly weapons under the first-degree robbery
statute. Although distinguishing the analysis method of the armed robbery statute
from section 245(a)(1), the court acknowledged that weaponless assault convictions under section 245(a)(1) "turn on the fact that hands or fists may be used with
sufficient force to create bodily injury, not that they fall into the class of deadly

weapons or instruments.").
Legal Texts:
17 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 536, 539 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
aggravated assault under California Penal Code section 245(a)(1)).
22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3771-3777 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
harmless and reversible error in a criminal proceeding).
1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against the Person §§ 417-20 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the nature
of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to inflict serious bodily injury).
6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Reversible
Error§ 3281 (1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the nature of reversible error).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Jacqueline C. Brown, Review of Selected 1993 CaliforniaLegislation;Crimes, 25
PAC. L. J. 511 (1994) (discussing generally California Penal Code section 245 and
recent amendments to provide sentence enhancements).
Courtney Crook Richardson, Miranda Violation is a Question of Law and Allows
Jury to Consider Hands as Deadly Weapons, 45 S.C. L. REV. 114 (1993)
(addressing the ways in which other states have resolved the issue of whether
hands and feet can be considered deadly weapons).
David Hughes, Comment, The Unconstitutionalityof Colorado's First Degree
Assault Statute, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1994) (discussing the potential
unconstitutionality of a first degree assault statute which includes hands and feet
as deadly weapons).

KAREN CHAPMAN

[Vol. 26: 169, 1998]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

D.

Under three strikes law, consecutive sentences are not mandatory in
sentencing a defendant who is a priorfelony offender, and who is convicted
of multiple current felony offenses, if those multiple current felonies were
committed on the same occasion, or arise from the same set of operative
facts.

People v. Hendrix, Supreme Courtof California,DecidedAugust 18, 1997, 16 Cal.
4th 508, 941 P.2d 64, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431.
Facts. California Penal Code sections 667(c)(6) and (c)(7) require that consecutive
sentences be imposed in a current conviction for more than one felony that does not
arise from the same set of operative facts. The defendant, James Duell Hendrix,
approached two couples sitting at a table in a shopping center on April 7, 1994.
Holding a semiautomatic weapon, he demanded their money. The two men gave
the defendant their money, while the women said they had none. The defendant
was later arrested and found guilty of two counts of robbery, as well as two counts
of attempted robbery. The defendant subsequently admitted to three prior serious
felony convictions. He was thereafter sentenced to state prison for 4 consecutive
terms of 25 years to life. Additionally, he was sentenced to a determinate term of
20 years for the firearm use enhancements, and a determinate term of 15 years for
the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.
The trial court found the defendant guilty, and ordered his sentences to run
consecutively. The court of appeal granted review, and held that the imposition of
consecutive sentences is not mandatory, but merely discretionary, in cases where
a defendant has two or more serious prior felony convictions and is convicted of
multiple felonies based upon a single act of violence against multiple victims. The
Supreme Court of California granted the Attorney General's petition for review.
Holding. Affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of
appeal, the supreme court held that consecutive sentences are not mandatory under
three strikes law if multiple current felonies were committed on the same occasion
or arise out of the same set of operative facts. Whether sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently is therefore a decision which is subject to the trial
court's discretion.
Justice Brown first reviewed the language of Penal Code section 667(c)(6),
which states that consecutive sentences are mandatory for any current felony
convictions "not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same
set of operative facts." "It is difficult," the court posited, "to understand how the
Legislature could have intended anything else by these words." The court
thereafter concluded that by implication, consecutive sentences are not mandatory

under subdivision (c)(6) if the multiple current felony convictions arise from the
same set of operative facts.
Reviewing the language of section 667(c)(7), which provides for consecutive
convictions for felonies not arising from the same set of facts, the court further
underscored this point. Consecutive sentences are not mandated under (c)(7) if all
of the serious or violent current felony convictions are committed on the same
occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts. In an attempt to close up
any potential legal loopholes, the court then discussed the situations where
sentences are not mandated to be consecutive. Thus, where consecutive sentences
are not required under a statute other than the three strikes law, the trial court
retains discretion to sentence the defendant either concurrently or consecutively.
The court finally addressed the issue of the definition of the phrase "indeterminate term" in 667(e)(2)(B), as it applies to consecutive terms. The court held
that an indeterminate term must be imposed consecutive to any other term of
enhancement, thus serving the three strikes law's overall goal "of ensuring longer
prison sentences and greater punishment." Thus, the Court concluded not only that
the consecutive sentences were not mandatory in this case, but that the trial court
was within the scope of its discretion. The most efficient procedure in a case such
as this, the court reasoned, is to allow the trial court to decide whether to sentence
the defendant consecutively or concurrently.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(6) (West 1998) (stating that the court shall sentence a

defendant to consecutive sentences for each count in a current conviction for more
than one felony count which does not arise from the same occasion or set of facts).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(7) (West 1998) (stating that the court shall impose

consecutive sentences for each conviction in (c)(6) for which the defendant may
be given consecutive sentences by law).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1998) (sentencing guidelines where a

defendant has a prior felony conviction).
Case Law:
People v. Deloza, 18 Cal. 4th 585, 957 P.2d 945, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 (1998)
(discussing the discretionary nature of a trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences when crime occurred on the "same occasion").
People v. Preciado, 116 Cal. App. 3d 409, 172 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1981) (sentencing
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the defendant to full, separate, and consecutive prison terms for each rape did not
violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
People v. Carter, 41 Cal. App. 4th 683, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (1996) (defendant had
to be consecutively sentenced for each count of premeditated attempted murder of
three victims on a single occasion).
Legal Texts:
6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Judgment and
Attack in Trial Court § 3113 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing differences in both
concurrent and consecutive sentences).

3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment
for Crime § 1473 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing sentence enhancements in general).
3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment
for Crime § 1475 (2d ed. 1989) (comparing consecutive and concurrent sentences).
3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment
for Crime § 1476 (2d ed. 1989) (analyzing differences between indeterminate and
determinate sentences).
21 AM. JUR. IV(C) § 552 (1997) (generally discussing concurrent and consecutive
or cumulative sentences).

22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2263-2291 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
enhancement of punishment generally).

22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3417 (1984 & Supp. 199,8) (reviewing additional
terms and enhancement of sentences).

22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3414-3421 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (analyzing
determinate and indeterminate sentences generally).

Law Review and Journal Articles:
Justin Brooks, The Politics of Prisons,77 MICH. B.J. 154 (Feb. 1998) (discussing
the recent legal trend of consecutive sentences as a means of enhancing punishment).
Janet Alberghini, Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines:
Difficult Choicefor the New FederalSentencing Commission, 35 CATHOLIC U. L.
REv. 181 (Fall 1985) (discussing concurrent and consecutive prison sentences and
judicial discretion in deciding between them).
Alexander Bunin, Time andAgain: Concurrentand Consecutive SentencesAmong
State and FederalJurisdiction,21-MAR CHAMPION 34 (March 1997) (discussing
when concurrent or consecutive sentences are allowed).

DEREK BROWN
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E.

State and federal double jeopardy clauses and the "hallmarks of the trial"
analysis do not apply to a noncapital proceeding to determine the truth of
a priorserious felony. Sentencing proceedings that have "the hallmarks of
the trial on guilt or innocence" are not barred by the double jeopardy
clauses.

People v. Angel Jaime Monge, Supreme Courtof California,Decided August 27,
1997, 16 Cal. 4th 826, 941 P.2d 1121, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 853.

Facts. On January 25, 1995, undercover police officers with the Pomona Police
Department pulled into an alley where the officers had previously observed drug
activity. The defendant, Angel Jaime Monge, approached the vehicle. One of the
officers rolled down his window and asked the defendant where he could buy
marijuana. Without answering, the defendant walked away. Shortly thereafter, the
defendant returned to a spot behind the vehicle. The officers observed the
defendant give a thirteen-year-old boy some plastic bags. The boy then approached the vehicle and asked the officers how much marijuana they wanted. The
officers requested two "dime bags," and then received two bags of marijuana for
two $10 bills. Following this transaction, other officers arrested the defendant.
The defendant possessed the same two $10 bills given to the boy by the officers.
The State charged the defendant with using a minor to sell marijuana, the sale
or transportation of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for sale in violation of
Health and Safety Code, sections 11351, 11360, and 11359, respectively. The
State also contended that the defendant had a "prior serious felony conviction"
within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i); §
1 170.12(a)-(d)), and a "prior prison term" within the meaning of section 667.5 of
the California Penal Code. The trial court agreed to bifurcate the determination of
these two allegations. The trial court found both contentions to be true and
sentenced the defendant to eleven years in prison. This sentence consisted of five
years for using a minor to sell marijuana, which the trial court doubled to ten under
the Three Strikes Law, and an additional year for the previous prison term. The
trial court also sentenced the defendant to an additional two years, to run
concurrently, for possessing marijuana for sale. The trial court stayed the sentence
for the defendant's conviction of selling marijuana pursuant to section 654 of the
California Penal Code.
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, but reversed the trial court's
finding that the defendant had a previous serious felony conviction. The court of
appeal further held that double jeopardy provisions within the state and federal
constitutions prohibited retrial of the prior felony allegation. The California
Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the state and federal prohibi-

tions against double jeopardy apply to a proceeding In a noncapital case to
determine whether the defendant had a prior serious felony conviction.
Holding. The California Supreme Court held that federal and state double
jeopardy provisions did not apply to the trial to determine whether the defendant
had a prior serious felony conviction. The court thereby reversed the decision of
the court of appeal to the extent it prohibited a retrial of the prior serious felony
conviction allegation on double jeopardy grounds. In addition, the court held that
sentencing proceedings that have "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence"
are not barred by the double jeopardy clauses.
The court noted that in a noncapital case, a state that elects to provide a trial
to determine whether there exists a prior serious felony conviction can reduce
procedural safeguards that characterize a trial on guilt or innocence, so long as
minimal due process is maintained; for example, a trial by jury. Because a state
need not provide a trial on such a matter at all, the court indicated that the state
likely need not provide double jeopardy protection to such proceedings. However,
under section 1025 of the California Penal Code, a defendant is entitled to a jury
trial for the determination of whether that defendant has suffered a prior conviction.
The court first examined judicial precedent pertaining to the double jeopardy
clause of the federal Constitution, noting that the clause itself makes no express
reference to sentencing determinations. The court pointed out that the United
States Supreme Court, in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1991), held that the
retrial of the penalty phase of a Missouri capital trial was prohibited by the double
jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution because it had "the hallmarks of the trial
on guilt or innocence." These "hallmarks" included the right to a jury, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, notice to the defendant of the facts to be proved, a
sentencing choice, the introduction of evidence and presentation of argument, and
a requirement of jury unanimity. However, the court distinguished Bullington on
a variety of grounds.
First, the court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court has suggested
in cases subsequent to Bullington that Bullington does not apply to noncapital
cases. Additionally, the court pointed out that a trial of prior conviction allegations
does not require the trier of fact to determine whether aggravating or mitigating
circumstances exist. Nor can the trier of fact reject a longer sentence when the
factual determinations support such a sentence. Thus, the factual determinations
in a section 1025 trial are narrower and less subjective than those in Bullington.
The court further reasoned that when the United States Supreme Court decided
Bullington, it essentially distinguished its own precedent from Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), which held that double jeopardy did not bar the
defendant's sentence of death following a retrial of the first degree murder charge
after a successful appeal, when the original sentence was life in prison. This
distinction was on the basis of procedural safeguards in death penalty cases, and
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was thus not applicable here, because this was a noncapital case.
The court also distinguished the present case from Bullington based on the
financial and emotional burden at sentencing. The court reasoned that the level of
embarrassment, expense, and anxiety at trial to determine the truth of prior
conviction allegations is much less than that at the guilt phase of a trial. Additionally, the court noted that here, the defendant had already suffered the embarrassment and anxiety of the present conviction, and therefore, any further embarrassment at the trial to determine the truth of a prior conviction was marginal. The
court went on to state that in a trial to determine the truth of a prior conviction
allegation, the factual determinations are separate from those applicable to the
present conviction. Therefore, this evidence does not overlap as evidence might
at the penalty phase of a capital case.
The court also looked to Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994), for
guidance. In Caspari,the high court noted that the procedural safeguards that exist
in a capital case are not necessarily applicable to other cases. The California
Supreme Court observed that in Caspari,the United States Supreme Court held
that the sentence conferred upon the defendant in that case was "consistent with
established constitutional standards" because the double jeopardy clause was never
applied to a sentencing other than one in a capital case. The California Supreme
Court extrapolated from this decision that although it was unknown how the United
States Supreme Court would decide the issue before this court, the sentence here,
like the sentence in Caspari, was "consistent with established constitutional
standards" because it did not involve a capital case.
Furthermore, the court distinguished its own opinion from People v. Superior
Court(Marks), 1 Cal. 4th 56, 820 P.2d 613, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (1991). In Marks,
the court applied double jeopardy protection in a noncapital case to prohibit a
retrial of a sentence-enhancing allegation. The court noted that because Marks
dealt with non-complex issues, it was distinguishable from the complex issues in
this case, and thus, deserved a narrow reading. Further, the court indicated that its
decision in Marks was based on an interpretation of the California Constitution that
has no bearing on the interpretation of the federal constitution, and thus, was
irrelevant here.
Finally, the court examined whether the California Constitution prohibited
retrial of the prior conviction allegation. The court indicated that to apply a
different construction of the California Constitution provision that is similar to one
in the federal Constitution, "cogent reasons must exist." The court determined that
no such reasons existed here.
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F.

California's new three strikes law, California Penal Code § 1170.12, states
that recidivist felons are to receive a separate determinate term for
sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to California Penal Code §
667(a), even though those same enhancements were used in the calculation
of the felons' indeterminate life terms imposed pursuant to California
Penal Code § 1170.12. The separate determinate term and the indeterminate life term are to run consecutively.

People v. Dotson, Supreme Court of California,DecidedAugust 18, 1997, 16 Cal.
4th 547, 941 P.2d 56, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423.

Facts. On November 8, 1994, California voters elected to enact Proposition 184,
which stated that persons convicted of a third serious or violent felony would be
sentenced to an indeterminate life term of imprisonment. On December 16, 1994,
defendant Tyrone Craig Dotson burglarized the home of Victoria Patterson. Ms.
Patterson, who was home alone at the time of Dotson's burglary, locked herself in
the bathroom and screamed out to her son, David, who resided nearby. David
heard his mother's screams and, along with some friends, gave chase to the fleeing
Dotson. The police later apprehended Dotson. Dotson was tried and convicted of
first-degree burglary. Dotson had been convicted of four prior serious felonies:
residential burglary in 1981; voluntary manslaughter in 1983; attempted murder in
1986; and residential burglary, also in 1986.
Dotson's present burglary conviction carried a six-year upper term. To
calculate the defendant's indeterminate life term, the trial court added the six-year
burglary sentence to four five-year enhancements imposed under section 667(a) for
the defendant's prior serious felony convictions. Thus, the defendant's minimum
indeterminate sentence was calculated by the trial court to be 26 years. A separate
determinate sentence of 20 years was not added for the enhancements. The court
of appeal modified and affirmed the judgment. The Attorney General petitioned
the California Supreme Court for review, arguing that section 1170.12 requires the
imposition of a separate determinate term for enhancements.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court held that
a separate determinate term for section 667(a) enhancements must be added to an
indeterminate life term imposed under section 1170.12. The court further held that
the indeterminate life term and the separate determinate term for enhancements
were to run consecutively.
Section 1170.12 requires that a trial court sentence a defendant with two or
more prior convictions for serious felonies to an indeterminate life term of
imprisonment. The minimum term that the defendant must serve before becoming
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eligible for parole is calculated by determining which of the three sentencing
options set forth in section 1170.12(c) will result in the greatest minimum term for
the particular defendant. The minimum term will vary from one defendant to
another based on the severity of the underlying offense and the number of prior
serious felony convictions on the particular defendant's record.
Option (i) provides that the defendant's minimum term shall be three times the
normal sentence for the underlying conviction. Option (i) will result in long
minimum terms for offenders whose underlying conviction is for relatively serious
felonies: e.g., one who is sentenced to twenty years for murder must serve a
minimum term of sixty years before becoming eligible for parole for an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to section 1170.12. Option (ii) sets forth a
minimum term of twenty-five years for all offenders. Option (iii) establishes a
minimum term calculated by adding the term of the underlying felony to any
applicable enhancements the defendant faces.
Thus, under option (i), Dotson's minimum term would be 18 years (six years
for the underlying burglary conviction multiplied by three). Under option (ii),
Dotson would have received a minimum term of 25 years. Under option (iii),
Dotson would receive six years for the underlying burglary conviction plus four
five-year enhancements for an aggregate minimum term of 26 years. As such,
option (iii) resulted in the greatest minimum term for Dotson.
The Attorney General argued that when a defendant is sentenced for a current
serious felony, section 1170.12 requires that the trial court impose a separate
determinate term for enhancements. According to the Attorney General, Dotson
should serve a minimum of 26 years on the indeterminate life term and a separate
determinate term of 20 years for the section 667(a) enhancements.
The Attorney General argued that because it is well-settled that a separate
determinate term for enhancements is added under options (i) and (ii), it would be
inconsistent with the statutory language of section 1170.12(c) to not add a separate
determinate term for enhancements when option (iii) is employed. Dotson
disagreed and asserted that separate determinate terms for enhancements are not
imposed in addition to the indeterminate life terms imposed under options (i) and
(ii).
The court held that separate determinate terms for enhancements are imposed
under options (i) and (ii). The court reasoned that the language of section
1170.12(c) is unambiguous. The section specifically provides that the indeterminate life term must be imposed "in addition to any other enhancements or
punishment provisions which may apply." The court determined that this language
should be read to include enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667(a).
The court further held that the indeterminate life term and the separate
determinate term for enhancements should run consecutively. The court again
relied upon the language of the statute. Section 1170.12(c)(2)(B) provides that "the
indeterminate term.., shall be served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for which a consecutive term may be imposed by law." The Court relied
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upon its holding in People v. Hendrix, 16 Cal. 4th 508, 941 P.2d 64, 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d 431 (1997), to construe the language "any other term" to include enhancements
for prior felony convictions.
In rejecting Dotson's contentions, the court also reasoned that accepting
Dotson's arguments would mean that there would be no distinction between the
sentence of a felon whose third strike conviction was a serious felony and one
whose third strike felony was non-serious. Because the voters clearly intended that
defendants convicted of serious felonies be treated more harshly than defendants
convicted of non-serious felonies, the court determined that Dotson's reading of
the statute would circumvent the intent of the people in enacting Proposition 184.
Dotson also contended that the addition of a separate determinate term for
section 667(a) enhancements to a section 1170.12 indeterminate life term would
run directly counter to the language of section 667(a). Dotson argued that, by its
terms, section 667(a) does not apply "when the punishment imposed under other
provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment." Because the 26year minimum indeterminate life term is a longer term of imprisonment than the
20-year separate determinate term which Dotson faced under section 667(a),
Dotson argued that section 667(a) was inapplicable to his case.
The court rejected this argument and stated that the court's holding in People
v. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 857 P.2d 1163, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (1993), was
authoritative on the point. In that case, the court determined that the predecessor
to section 667(a) meant that "when multiple statutory enhancement provisions are
available for the same prior offense, one of which is a section 667(a) enhancement,
the greatest enhancement, but only that one, will apply." Because of this
interpretation, the court held that only enhancements were included in the
exclusionary language of section 667(a) relied upon by Dotson. As such, the
exclusionary language of section 667(a) could not be construed to include the
indeterminate life term imposed pursuant to section 1170.12.
All of the defendant's arguments having been rejected, the court ruled that
separate determinate terms for enhancements are added to indeterminate life terms
imposed pursuant to options (i) and (ii) of section 1170.12(c). The court relied
upon the same arguments illustrated above to determine that separate determinate
terms for enhancements must also be added to indeterminate life terms imposed
under option (iii). The court reasoned that the imposition of such separate
determinate terms under options (i) and (ii) but not under option (iii) would lead
to anomalous results in that it would permit defendants with more egregious
recidivist histories to receive lesser punishments than defendants with fewer prior
serious felony convictions. The court determined that this result would clearly
circumvent the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 184: "to ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
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been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." Ballot
Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64.
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CAL. PENAL CODE

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1998) (imposing indeterminate life term for
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People v. Cartwright, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1123, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (1995) (three
strikes law should include appropriate term plus enhancement under section 667).
Legal Texts:
22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3365 (1985) (separate determinate term to be
added for serious felony).
22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3367 (1985) (separate determinate term to be
added for violent felony).
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for Crimes § 12 (2d ed. 1988) (generally discussing the nature of crime and the
need for punishment).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Lisa E. Cowart, LegislativePrerogativevs. JudicialDiscretion:California'sThree
Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615 (Spring 1998) (generally
discussing California's three strikes law).
Christopher M. Alexander, IndeterminateSentencing: An Analysis of Sentencing
in America, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717 (1997) (comparing, different punishment
schemes including California's three strikes law).
Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court
Restores Democracy, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1643 (1997) (discussing the California
Supreme Court's decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497
(1996), and the political aspects of the initiative process in California).
Markus Dirk Dubber, RecidivistStatutes as RationalPunishment,43 BuFF. L. REV.
689 (1995) (discussing the rationality of imposing extra punishment for recidivists).
Mark W. Owens, Crimes; Sentence Enhancement-Repeat Offenders: "Three
Strikes You're Out,"26 PAC. L.J. 442 (1995) (discussing California's three strikes
law).

CHRISTOPHER BRIDGES
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III. DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITIONS
The term "answer" in the Code of Civil Procedure section 2025(o) includes
nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a videotaped deposition; therefore, if
a deponent refuses to comply with an order requiring a re-enactment of an event
at a videotaped deposition, he or she may be subject to discovery sanctions.
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of California, Decided
December 1, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1101, 946 P.2d 841, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 883.

Facts. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025 was enacted as part of the Civil
Discovery Act of 1986. Section 2025 regulates oral depositions, including those
that are videotaped, and provides guidelines for a party seeking to enforce a
discovery right. Subdivision (o) expresses that a party who fails to "answer any
question" during a deposition will be subject to sanctions. This case addressed the
scope of the term "answer" and specifically whether an "answer" includes
nonverbal responses.
The plaintiff, William S. Grayson, was injured while using a radial arm saw
that was manufactured by the defendant, Emerson Electric Company. At the
deposition, the defendant asked the plaintiff to diagram his position at the time of
the accident as well as to perform a re-enactment of the accident. The plaintiff's
attorney refused to allow him to provide nonverbal testimony, relying on Stermer
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (1993), which held
that a nonverbal response was beyond the scope of discovery, and the trial court
could therefore not order a deponent to give nonverbal testimony. The defendant
moved for an order to compel the plaintiff to provide nonverbal testimony,
including a re-enactment, at the videotaped deposition. The plaintiff contended
that a failure to "answer any question" referred only to verbal responses. The
defendant alleged that the plaintiff should be compelled to re-enact his injury
because section 2025 includes the category of nonverbal responses.
The trial court held for the plaintiff in reliance upon the court of appeal's
decision in Stermer, holding that a trial court does not have the authority to compel
a nonverbal response. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision and
held for the defendant, claiming that Stermer was incorrect, and that a deponent
should be compelled to answer nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a
videotaped deposition. The court of appeal ordered a peremptory writ of mandate
be issued. The Supreme Court of California granted review to consider two
relevant issues: (1) whether the term "answer" in section 2025(o) includes
nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a videotaped deposition and (2) whether
sanctions are appropriate when a deponent refuses to obey a trial court's order
commanding a nonverbal response.
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Holding. Affirming the holding of the court of appeal, the majority of the
California Supreme Court held that: (1) the term "answer" in section 2025(o)
includes nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a videotaped deposition and (2)
a trial court may impose sanctions when a deponent fails to obey an order
commanding a nonverbal response.
The court first analyzed the reasoning in Stermer and proclaimed that it was
erroneous because the definition of "answer" is to "act in response to a request,"
which would include nonverbal responses at a videotaped deposition. Thus,
including nonverbal responses would comply with the ordinary meaning of the
term "answer."
Second, the court stated that section 2025(o) should be defined in congruence
with section 2025(l)(1), which permits a nonverbal answer, including a reenactment, at a trial. Additionally, permitting nonverbal responses in discovery
statutes would further the legislature's goals: (1) educating the parties about the
claims and defenses, (2) fostering settlements, and (3) encouraging a speedy trial.
In explaining this reasoning, the court relied on Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, (1961), which stated that
courts must liberally construe discovery statutes in order to foster disclosure.
Thus, a party may obtain discovery for any matter as long as it can be "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Third, the court looked to the legislative history of the statute and recalled that
the Discovery Act of 1986 was implemented to assimilate the California discovery
provisions with Federal provisions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include
nonverbal responses such as re-enactments. The court further noted that the former
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019 was originally designed to permit the
recording of nonverbal as well as verbal responses. Moreover, the legislature
amended the discovery statutes to allow for depositions to be videotaped, thereby
encouraging nonverbal testimony.
Fourth, the court addressed the plaintiff's warning that a videotaped deposition
would provoke abuse of discovery because demonstrations and re-enactments are
"inherently misleading." The court quickly discredited this idea, stating that reenactments and demonstrations are more reliable and factual than a verbal
response. The plaintiff alleged that because depositions are not supervised by a
judge, a nonverbal response would be too risky and burdensome for the deponent.
The court referred the plaintiff to the safeguards found in section 2025, which do
not require a judge. Additionally, a party may seek a protective order to protect
against unduly burdensome or embarrassing testimony.
Finally, the plaintiff guided the court to the decision in Peoplev. Dabb, 32 Cal.
2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948), which concentrated on the misuse of evidence in the
form of a motion picture. The court in Dabb concluded that a motion picture that
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artificially re-enacts an event should be looked upon with caution because it tends
to focus on unimportant happenings. The court found Dabb to be inapposite
because Dabb focused on a motion picture re-enactment for a criminal trial and not
a deposition.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(o) (West Supp. 1997) (discussing the nature of
depositions and sanctions when a party does not comply with discovery).
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Stermer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (1993)
(stating that a trial court does not have the authority to order a deponent to give
nonverbal testimony).
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr.
90 (1961) (expressing that discovery statutes must be construed liberally).
Legal Texts:
27 CAL. JUR. 3d Evidence §§ 85-96 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (generally discussing
discovery and depositions).
27 CAL. JUR. 3d Evidence § 121 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (discussing sanctions when
a party is compelled to give a deposition).
2 B.E. WITKIN, EVIDENCE, Videotaped Recording of Deposition § 1459 (4th ed.
Supp. 1998) (discussing the way in which videotaped depositions should be
regulated).
7 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Completion of Discovery § 84 (4th ed.
1997) (discussing the methods for completing discovery).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Andrew T. Citrin, Comment, Rules And Case Law Governing Videotaped
Depositions, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87 (1988) (discussing the pros and cons of
the popularity of videotaped depositions).
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Perspective, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38 (Nov. 1988) (analyzing some problems inherent
in videotaped depositions, such as a lack of neutrality).
Thomas S. Riggs III, Note, Federal Rule 30(b)(4) and The Use Of Videotaped
Depositions,33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 145 (1988) (discussing the technical advances
in the taking of depositions).
Steven W. Quattlebaum, General Practitioners Primer, Effective Video Presentations at Trial: Put On a Good Show, But Cut To The Chase-PartII, 27 SUM ARK.
LAw 56 (1993) (claiming that videotaped depositions are not prohibited in any
jurisdiction).

JENNIFER ELLIOT

IV. EMINENT DOMAIN
A landowner's entitlement to severance damages in an eminent domain action
is not limited to "special" benefits, and it is necessary for the fact finder to take
into consideration any evidence relevant to circumstances created by the project
that would affect the fair market value of the land not taken as long as such
evidence is not theoretical nor uncertain.
LosAngeles CountyMetro. Transp.Auth. v. ContinentalDev. Corp., Supreme Court
of California,Decided August 25, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 694, 941 P.2d 809, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 630.

Facts. The California Constitution controls the taking of private property by
requiring that just compensation be paid to the owner, and by statute the owner is
entitled to the fair market value of the land taken. If the land taken is part of a
larger area, the owner may be entitled to compensation for any damage done to the
remaining property. On this issue, the plaintiff, Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, brought a condemnation action to acquire land owned
by the defendant, Continental Development Corporation, in order to construct a
light rail line.
The defendant owned a 14-acre area of land that was divided into three
parcels. On September 4, 1990, the plaintiff brought an eminent domain action in
order to obtain certain interests in a small area of one of the parcels for the purpose
of building a railway. At the commencement of this action, the land was
unimproved, but by the time of trial, the defendant had built an office building on
the site. At that time, the railway was not operating.
In pretrial proceedings relating to the defendant's severance damage claim, the
plaintiff was denied the opportunity to present evidence that the value of the
defendant's building would increase as a result of its closeness to the new rail line.
The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible because the proximity to
the rail station was not unique to only the defendant and therefore was not a special
benefit.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. The defendant sought recovery of
severance damage based on three factors: building redesign, noise, and visual
impact. The defendant had to have the building redrawn so it was located further
away from the rail line, and thus wanted compensation. He also wanted compensation for the portion of the building facing the rail line that had to be sound proofed.
The factor causing major strife was the effect the visual impact of the line would
have on future rents, as they were projected to be lower as a result of the rail line.
The plaintiff had expert witnesses testify that in similar situations, there were no
decreases in rent for office buildings located closer to a rail line.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the defendant compensation for
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the property taken and for severance damages, though exact amounts for each are
not known. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, stating that (1) there was no
evidence to support severance damages for visual impact and (2) the trial court
erred in not allowing the evidence on enhanced value of the defendant's property
as a result of its closeness to the rail line, and thus arguing that the distinction
between general and special benefits is useless and should be abandoned. The
court denied the motion for a new trial, and also denied the defendant's motion for
litigation expenses. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, but reversed the
order denying the defendant's motion for litigation damages. The California
Supreme Court granted review to consider whether distinguishing between special
and general benefits when determining just compensation has any relevance in
today's eminent domain actions.
Holdings. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal and remanding the case
for a new trial on severance damages consistent with its opinion, the California
Supreme Court held that there is no longer a distinction between special and
general benefits, and overruled Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619 (1902), to the
extent it holds that only special benefits may be offset against severance damages.
The court further defined its holding by stating that when determining a landowner's entitlement to severance damages, the fact finder shall consider any
relevant evidence relating to the effects on the remaining property's fair market
value. The court also held that the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason
when denying the defendant's motion, and therefore the court of appeal erred when
it ruled that the trial court abused its discretion.
The court began its holding with a discussion of relevant just compensation
history. The California Legislature, in 1861, enacted a statute giving private
railroad companies the power of eminent domain by reasoning that the private
companies were performing a public service in providing transportation. The
Railroad Act established that benefits be setoff of the compensation owed to the
landowners, and case law soon followed suit and allowed "benefits and advantages
to be considered in ascertaining what is a just compensation to be awarded."
After the principle of setoffs had been set, former article I, section 14 of the
California Constitution was construed as precluding setoffs and precluding private
railroads from taking land without just compensation, and the latter was in direct
contrast with the statutory provisions of the time. The former section was added
to the California Constitution because the railroads were taking land and saying
that the value of the remaining land that the landowners would derive was just
compensation in and of itself. Former section 1248, like present section 1263.4 10,
provided for setoff of benefits without limitation in all cases in which property is
taken. In Beveridge, the court established the principle that only special benefits
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could be offset. The Beveridge court defined the difference between special
benefits and general benefits, but never definitely stated how one was to come to
the conclusion that a benefit was general or that a benefit was special. For years
following the Beveridge ruling, courts did not clarify it and continuously stated
how inconsistent its application was.
The plaintiff argued that the legislative intent was in direct contrast with the
Beveridge rule that only special benefits can be setoff, and thus the plaintiff
contended that courts could not adhere to the Beveridge rule. The court determined
that the legislature intended the courts to develop the law pertaining to this area.
The second argument the plaintiff offered was that general benefits were defined
as uncertain while special benefits were those that were reasonably certain to
occur. The plaintiff stated that the benefits the defendant will experience are
immediate and so the benefit should be special no matter how many others will
experience the benefit.
The defendant proffered the argument that if all benefits were setoff, the setoff
would violate the equal protection principle because the defendant would end up
paying more for the public good than the surrounding neighbors. This reasoning
is that the defendant will have to give up land, and upon the compensation, get less
because of the setoff for the benefit soon to be experienced. The neighbors, on the
other hand, just get to experience the benefit.
The court reasoned that there is no way to ensure absolute fair distribution of
costs and benefits across the entire community. In considering this principle, the
court explained that a rule permitting offset of all reasonably certain, immediate,
and non-speculative benefits is the fairest in its application. "Fairness requires
parity of treatment." Present sections 1263.420 and 1263.430, which both consider
damages and benefits to remaining property, do not distinguish between special
and general benefits. For all of the above reasons, the court held that the fact finder
must consider evidence relevant to conditions caused by the project that affect the
remaining property's fair market value as long as such evidence is not uncertain or
just estimates of probable future benefits.
Consequently, to aid in retrial, the court also focused on the issue of litigation
expenses in eminent domain actions that are governed by section 1250.410. This
section requires the court to determine if expenses are awarded "in the light of the
evidence admitted and the compensation awarded in the proceeding." The
reasoning that the court used was that the defendant's offer did not give adequate
credence to its own expert's opinion, and to say that the plaintiff's failure to do so
was unreasonable would constitute a grave unfairness in the proceedings. Thus,
the plaintiff did not make the offer in bad faith or unreasonably.
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V. Environment
As a certified regulatory program, the Fish and Game Commission is entitled
to an exemption from the Environmental Impact Report process of the
California Environmental Quality Act in delisting a species from the endangered or threatened species list, even though the California Endangered Species
Act was enacted after the Fish and Game Commission received its certification.
Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish and Game Comm 'n, Supreme Court of California,
Decided July 31, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 105, 939 P.2d 1280, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580.

Facts. The California Endangered Species Act (CESA) charges the Fish and Game
Commission (Commission) with creating and maintaining a list of endangered or
threatened species while providing protection and management resources. The
Commission is responsible for developing criteria for identifying if a species is
threatened or endangered.
In 1991, Kern County submitted a petition to the Commission to delist the
Mojave ground squirrel from the list of threatened species. After the Commission
conducted an investigation spanning over two years that consisted of requesting
public comment, obtaining an independent report of the ground squirrel's status,
and a lengthy public hearing, the Commission delisted the Mojave ground squirrel
from the threatened species list.
The Mountain Lion Foundation (MLF), along with others, filed a petition for
writ of mandamus seeking to overturn the Commission's decision on the grounds
that the Commission neither complied with CESA's requirements nor provided
substantial evidence supporting the decision. The petition also asserted that the
Commission's delisting process violated the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) by not completing an Environmental Impact Report (EIR). The trial court
held that delisting the ground squirrel was an activity subject to CEQA, that none
of the CEQA exemptions applied, and that failure to prepare and certify an EIR
mandated the vacation of the decision. The CESA allegations were denied. Kern
County appealed the CEQA claims and MLF appealed the CESA claims. The
court of appeal affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that no conflict exists between CEQA and CESA requirements.
Because the legislative history does not reveal any intent to exempt the Commission from CEQA when fulfilling its obligations under CESA, no exemption exists.
CEQA was enacted to provide long-term environmental protection by requiring
any public agency engaging in activities that may cause significant and adverse
environmental changes to file an EIR. However, when some state agencies
operating under their own regulations prepare a plan or other environmental review
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document functionally equivalent to the EIR, an EIR is not required. In order to
qualify under this exemption, the state agency's regulatory scheme must be
certified by the Secretary of the Resource Agency and comply with all other CEQA
requirements.
Under CESA, the Commission must add or remove species from the
endangered or threatened list if there is sufficient scientific evidence pursuant to
Fish and Game Code sections 2070-2079 to warrant the action. To add or delete
a species from the list, a petition is filed to list or delist that contains scientific
information such as the "species population trend, range,,distribution, abundance,
and life history," or other relevant factors. The Department evaluates the petition
and, if sufficient scientific evidence supports it, the Department prepares a
recommendation and the Commission schedules a hearing for final consideration.
Because the listing and delisting process is a discretionary rather than ministerial
decision, requiring the exercise ofjudgment, the Commission's decision is subject
to CEQA pursuant to section 21004 of the Fish and Game Code.
Although the CESA requirements appear to be duplicative of the CEQA
requirements, the court held that because of the severity of delisting a species from
protection, the Commission's delisting decision-making process was not
duplicative, but was instead in furtherance of CEQA purposes by revealing the
environmental ramifications of the proposed removal. Additionally, because
CEQA applies to activities which may have a significant impact on the environment, the Commission's claim to categorical exemption from CEQA in delisting
a species was rejected. Only on a finding of the Secretary that an activity will not
have a significant environmental effect may an agency's activity receive
categorical exemption from CEQA. Delisting a species, however, impacts not only
that particular species but also the flora, fauna and cohabitating species. Thus, the
court reasoned that the delisting activity cannot be categorically exempt because
it has a significant environmental impact.
However, the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in finding
that delisting under CESA qualified as an express exemption to the CEQA EIR
requirements under Fish and Game section 21080.5(a). Under this section, a
certified regulatory program may generate an alternative environmental effect
document in lieu of an EIR. The supreme court reasoned that even though the
Secretary certified the regulatory program of the Fish and Game Commission in
1976 and CESA was not established until 1984, the certification applies to
subsequent programs unless and until the Secretary withdraws the certification.
Because the MLF did not petition for a decertification, that issue was not
before the court. Furthermore, because CESA's directives do not jeopardize the
Commission's certification criteria, the Commission may employ the certified
regulatory program review procedures while implementing CESA. The court
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reasoned that because the Secretary's certification of the Commission was in broad
terms and not expressly limited, as it has the power to do, the certification applied
to all activities of the Commission. The Secretary found the necessary link
between the regulation of hunting and fishing seasons and the issuance of licenses
of the Department of Fish and Game to qualify the Commission's regulatory
program under section 21080.5.
If the Commission is exempt from the EIR, then it must strictly adhere to its
own procedures under its certified regulatory program. Nonetheless, because the
Commission operated under the assumption that it was categorically exempt from
CEQA, rather than exempt under section 21080.5 subject to the certified regulatory
program, the Commission failed to satisfy its own procedural requirements.
Because the Commission failed to respond to significant environmental opposition
prior to delisting the Mojave ground squirrel, the Commission violated the written
response element of its certified regulatory program. Additionally, the Commission failed to consider "feasible project alternatives and mitigation measures" in
further violation of the program's directives. For these reasons, the court held that
the Commission abused its discretion in delisting the Mojave ground squirrel from
the endangered species list.
REFERENCES
Statutory and Legislative History:
CAL. PUB.
Act).

RES. CODE

§ 21000 (West 1996) (California Environmental Quality
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Cal. App. 4th 1371, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (1993) (finding project disapprovals by
a public agency are exempt from CEQA review under Public Resources Code §
21080(b)(5)).
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34 CAL. JUR. 3D Fish and Game §§ 75-78 (1993) (discussing generally refuges and
endangered, threatened, and protected species).
34 CAL. JuR. 3D Fish and Game § 31 (1993) (discussing the powers of the Fish and
Game Commission).
50 CAL. JUR. 3D Pollutionand ConservationLaws §475 (1993) (discussing CEQA
generally and use of feasible alternatives or mitigation measures).
4 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 58-59 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp.
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4 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW § 59B (Supp. 1998) (discussing

CEQA scope of reporting requirements).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
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"Take" and "Taking" Collide, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185 (1993) (discussing
takings by land use regulations related to endangered species).
Katherine S. Yagerman, ProtectingCritical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811 (1990) (examining the role of habitat
protection in ensuring the survival of endangered species).
Ruth McLay, Note, The Timber Harvest Plan Exemption From the California
EnvironmentalQuality Act: Due Processand Statutory Intent, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
727 (Mar. 1990) (discussing the interplay of CEQA with the Timber Harvest Plan).
Sean Stuart Varner, Comment, The CaliforniaEnvironmentalQualityAct (CEQA)
After Two Decades: Relevant Problems and Ideas for Necessary Reform, 19
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1447 (1992) (discussing the abuses and delays of CEQA
regulations).
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VI. INSURANCE
An insurer must defend an entire claim even if a portion of the claims asserted
are potentially covered. An insurer may seek reimbursement from the insured
for defense costs for claims that are not potentially covered by the insurance
policy. The insurer bears this burden of proof and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims were not potentially covered.
Buss v. SuperiorCourt, Supreme Court of Califomia, Decided July 24, 1997, 16
Cal. 4th 35, 939 P.2d 766, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366.
Facts. H & H Sports brought an action against Jerry Buss, owner and operator of
the Los Angeles Lakers and other professional sports teams. The suit, which was
filed in Superior Court, asserted twenty-seven causes of action ranging from breach
of contract to defamation. Buss notified his insurance carrier, Transamerica, of the
suit. Buss had two comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance
policies with Transamerica. These policies provided coverage for claims of
defamation, libel and slander in an amount up to $2 million. The terms of these
policies stated that Transamerica would defend any suit stemming from the
covered provisions. Of the twenty-seven claims asserted against Buss by H & H
Sports, only one was for defamation. Transamerica accepted to defend Buss on all
twenty-seven causes of action, even though only the defamation action was
potentially covered by the policies.
However, Transamerica reserved the right to be reimbursed for attorney's fees
and expenses incurred while defending those claims which were not covered.
Thus, pursuant to Civil Code section 2860, Transamerica paid for independent
counsel for Buss. Buss and H & H Sports settled for $8.5 million. Buss requested
contribution for the settlement from Transamerica, but was denied.
The
independent counsel's fees, which were financed by Transamerica, averaged
around $1 million. The cost of defending the defamation suit was estimated
between $21,720 and $55,767.50.
Buss brought suit against Transamerica alleging breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Buss claimed that
Transamerica had a duty to defend the entire action involving H & H Sports and
a duty to contribute to the settlement. Transamerica asserted a cross-complaint
seeking reimbursement of those claims not covered by the polices and a declaration
that they did not have to contribute to the settlement. Transamerica brought a
motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. Buss also
brought a motion for summary judgment on Transamerica's cross-complaint for

reimbursement of the defense costs. Buss cited Hogan v. Midland National
Insurance Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1970), for the
proposition that Transamerica could not recover costs unless it could prove by
"undeniable evidence" that the claims in question were not covered and that the
parties had knowledge to this effect. The court, in denying his motion for
summary judgment, interpreted the Hogan holding narrowly, concluding that it
only applied to those situations where an insurer wrongfully refused to defend an
action on behalf of its insured.
The court of appeal held that an insurer may seek reimbursement for those
claims which are not even potentially covered by the policy. The insurer must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to reimbursement. The
court also refused to apply Hogan, finding that the facts that substantiated Hogan's
holding did not apply to this situation. The California Supreme Court granted
review and stayed proceedings in the superior court.
Holding. In affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court began its analysis by explaining that an insurer's duty to defend claims
against the insured is almost as important as the duty to indemnify. The importance of the duty to defend can best be articulated by its broadness. While the duty
to indemnify reaches only to those claims actually covered, the duty to defend
extends farther, to include those claims which may not even be covered. Citing
policy considerations, the court concluded that in an action that contained "mixed
claims," such as an action that included claims that are potentially covered and
those that are not, the insurer's duty to defend extends to the entire action.
While appearing to give the insured a windfall, the court sought to clarify the
type of claims for which an insurer may seek reimbursement. As to claims that are
potentially covered, the insurer may not seek reimbursement because the insured
has contracted for this defense, providing consideration in the form of premiums.
However, an insurer may seek reimbursement for those claims that are not
potentially covered. In that instance, the parties have not contracted for the defense
of claims not covered. To allow the insured to receive this benefit would constitute
an unjust enrichment. Additionally, preventing an insurer reimbursement in these
instances may potentially lead to an insurer's refusal to defend a mixed claim.
Thus, the court concluded that the insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement for
those claims which are not even potentially covered because it has not been paid
premiums for the defense of those claims.
Turning to the issue of burden of proof, the supreme court cited Evidence
Code section 500, which states that a party seeking relief must carry the burden of
proof. The court adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard because it is
the one generally applicable to civil cases, especially contractual causes of action.
Finally, the court refused to apply Hogan's "undeniable evidence" standard,
holding that it was dictum and only applicable to those limited instances where an
insurer has wrongfully refused to defend an action against the insured.
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The court concluded that Buss's motion for summary judgment was properly
dismissed. Transamerica's insurance policy with Buss did not contract to cover all
claims. Thus, Transamerica met the contractual obligations of the policy when it
defended the defamation cause of action in the suit with H & H Sports. As to the
other causes of action, Transamerica was allowed to attempt to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was entitled to reimbursement costs incurred
while defending those causes of action not covered by the policy.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. EviD. CODE § 500 (West 1998) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, a
party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which
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ultimately not established).
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the duty to defend is triggered if "there is any potential for coverage").
Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal. Rptr.
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Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Homestead Land Dev. Corp., 145 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that an insurance company must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence what expenses are not covered by the policy).
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Val's Painting and Drywall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 267 (1976) (finding that the duty to defend extends to those claims that are
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Hogan v. Midland Nat'l. Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553,476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153
(1970) (holding that an insurer is liable for the entire amount of fees expended in
the defense of the insured, even if some aspects of the defense were outside the
scope of the policy).
Legal Texts:
39 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 561 (1998) (discussing the inception, duration, and
tennination of the duty to defend).
39 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 560 (1998) (discussing the statutory duty to provide
independent counsel in the event of a conflict of interest).
1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts§ 681 (9th ed. 1987)
(discussing the interpretation of contracts).
1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts§ 632D (9th ed. 1997)
(discussing an insurer's duty to defend its insured).
1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 26 (9th ed. 1987)
(discussing adhesion theory in the context of insurance policies).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional ProblemsofAdditional Insureds,33 TORT
& INS. L.J. 945 (1998) (discussing commercial general liability policies and
contributions).
Richard C. Coffin et al., InsuranceCoveragefor Toxic Exposureand Environmental Damage Under CGL Policies, SC64 A.L.I.-ABA 167 (1998) (analyzing the
impact of the court's decision in Buss and arguing that the standard of proof
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Robert E. Asperger et al., Recent Developments in Insurance CoverageLitigation,
33 TORTS & INS. L.J. 529 (1998) (detailing California's recent approach in
allowing reimbursement from the insured of defense costs).
John H. Reaves, The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 17 DEC CAL. LAW. 54 (1997)
(discussing the Supreme Court's enforcement of an insurer's duty to defend).
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VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A property owner need not forfeit all of his property to properly maintain an
action for inverse condemnation following a due process violation, though the
remedy, if available and adequate, obviates a finding of a taking.
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., Supreme Court of California,Decided
August 26, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 761, 941 P.2d 851, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672.

Facts. The appellant's property consisted of a 10-unit apartment building in the
city of Santa Monica. The City regulated housing through an administrative rent
control board. During the first year of operation, the appellant, Kavanau, collected
$43,444 in rent, while spending $33,565 for maintenance and operations, $82,934
for improvements, and $44,000 for debt payments. Subsequently, the appellant
applied to the Rent Board for an allowance to increase rent. The hearing examiner
determined Kavanau eligible for rent increases totaling $35,000 per year. The
examiner approved the increases over an eight-year period in order to satisfy the
yearly 12 percent cap on rent increases.
The appellant brought suit against the Rent Control Board of Santa Monica
alleging that the City's rent control laws were unconstitutional because they denied
him a just and reasonable return on his investment. The superior court denied
Kavanau's petition for a writ of administrative mandate to force a rent increase in
excess of 12 percent. Kavanau appealed the decision. The court of appeal found
the City's 12 percent cap unconstitutional because it denied Kavanau a just and
reasonable return on his investment.
Next, the appellant filed a second complaint. Kavanau sought damages and
"just compensation" flowing from the unconstitutional taking and damaging of his
property. In addition, the appellant alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based upon
a violation of his right to due process of law. The Rent Board demurred the
complaint, and the superior court sustained without leave to amend. The court of
appeal held that Kavanau had previously abandoned his § 1983 claim and rejected
his claim for damages stemming from the taking because he never lost full use of
the property. The California Supreme Court granted review to consider if Kavanau
suffered a taking and, if so, his right to compensation.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that a property owner need not forfeit all of his property in order to
properly maintain an action for inverse condemnation following a violation of due
process. The court concluded that Kavanau's available remedy precluded his
claims for a violation of due process of law and an unconstitutional taking. The
court determined that Kavanau's remedy, the adjustment of future rents, fully and
adequately compensated him for any losses flowing from a violation.
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To avoid due process violations, rent control regulations must bear "a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose." Furthermore, the regulations
must allow for a "fair return" on the investment to avoid a confiscation of property.
The test for a violation of due process requires a balancing of interests. A "court
must determine whether the [regulation] may reasonably be expected to maintain
financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the
risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection for the relevant
public interests, both existing and foreseeable."
Moreover, rent regulations must not "go too far" and effect a taking without
just compensation. The court noted "two categories of regulatory action" which
constitute a taking. First, a "permanent physical invasion of property, no matter
how slight, effects a taking requiring compensation." Second, a regulation that
"deprives a property owner of 'all economically beneficial or productive use of
land' effects a taking requiring compensation." The court noted that a regulation
not falling within the two specific categories required an ad hoc analysis for proper
evaluation. The court emphasized three factors set forth by the United States
Supreme Court for an ad hoc analysis: (1) the regulation's economic impact; (2)
the regulation's interference with investment expectations; and (3) the government
action. In addition, the court recognized several other relevant factors to be
considered: (1) the regulation's effect on existing uses; (2) the state's interest
involved; and (3) whether the property owner is able to achieve a reasonable return
on his investment. The court further noted that future rent, even though governed
by ceilings, must allow for a fair return that will "maintain financial integrity,
attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate [him] for the risks [he has]
assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests,
both existing and foreseeable."
The court's first analytical test determined that the City's rent regulations fell
outside the scope of the "two discrete categories of regulatory action" and thus
failed to effectuate a taking. The court reasoned that because the rent regulations
failed to establish a physical invasion of property, and the court of appeal already
held that Kavanau retained some of the economic benefit of his property, his
claims, even if true, failed to establish a taking. In addition, the court performed
an ad hoc analysis of Kavanau's claims subject to the aforementioned factors. The
court noted that Kavanau suffered a minimal economic impact when the benefits
of property ownership were balanced against the burdens of ownership. For
example, Kavanau collected rental income from the property, while building equity
in the property. Similarly, the court recognized that Kavanau possessed constructive knowledge of the pertinent regulations when he improved the property, and
thus found that the interference with his investment expectations was minor.

229

In addition, the court noted that the regulation affected Kavanau's "primary
expectation" largely because of his own choice to renovate the building. The court
also recognized the Board's legitimate interest in protecting tenants from sudden
or large increases in rent. Moreover, the court noted that it owed no duty to protect
individuals from poor investment choices. Thus, the court determined by ad hoc
analysis that Kavanau failed to establish a taking. Furthermore, the court held that
a "remedy for the due process violation, if available and adequate, obviates a
finding of a taking." The court reasoned that because the rent regulations allowed
for yearly increases, Kavanau's fair rate of return could be balanced over a course
of years, and thus the remedy precluded his actions for a due process violation and
an unconstitutional taking.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
U.S. CONST. amend, XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) ("a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law").
CAL CONST. art. I, § 15 ("Persons may not ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use
only when just compensation.., has been paid.").
Case Law:
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that no physical taking occurred
after the application of rent regulations).
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that land use
regulations violate the takings clause if they fail to "substantially advance
legitimate state interests" or deny the property owner an "economically viable
use").
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (discussing an ad
hoc analysis for a taking and the relevant factors to consider).
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Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129,550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976) (holding that rent control laws must allow landlords a just and reasonable
return on their investment).
Legal Texts:
13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 144 (1989 & Supp. 1998) (generally
discussing property rights subject to police power).
13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw § 146 (1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
regulation of property rights).
8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw

§ 938 (9th ed.

1987) (generally discussing a valid exercise of police power).
8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 939 (9th ed.

Supp. 1997) (discussing a taking that requires compensation).
4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property§ 558 (9th ed. 1987
& Supp. 1998) (discussing modem rent control laws).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1983) (examining a variety of rent control
guidelines and formulas).
Timothy L. Collins, "FairRents" or "ForcedSubsidies" Under Rent Regulation:
Finding Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293
(1996) (discussing the current trends and myths of a fair return on investment
under rent control regulations).
Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: InstitutionalAnalysis and the Problem of
Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591 (1998) (examining the institutional forces
applying pressure to the courts in cases of regulatory takings).

Dwight H. Merriam, What Is the Relevant Parcel in Takings Litigation?,SC43
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 505 (1998) (discussing the history and current status of regulatory
takings).
R. S. Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990's: The Death of Rent Control,
21 SW. U. L. REv. 1019 (1992) (analyzing the effects of regulatory controls under
Nollan).

JESSE CARYL
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VIII. MONOPOLIES AND RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
Business & Professions Code, section 16750 gives counties and other governmental entities the authority to bring and prosecute Cartwright Act antitrust
actions. Furthermore, the legislature, through Government Code, sections
23000 and 23004(a) gave counties the same powers as corporations, and thus
can seek damages in federal court for injuries incurred from antitrust violations.
Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, Supreme Court of California,
Decided December4, 1997, 16 Cal.4th 1143, 947 P.2d. 291, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329.

Facts. Stanislaus County brought a class action suit in federal court alleging that
Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") and a subsidiary violated state and
federal antitrust laws by engaging in illegal price-fixing that significantly increased
the County's cost for natural gas. The County alleged that PG&E conspired with
several producers and distributors to fix the price of natural gas imported into
California. The suit alleged federal law violations under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act, and alleged violations of state law
under the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Practices Act. While this class action was
pending, PG&E initiated the present case by suing Stanislaus County, its Board of
Directors, and the Stanislaus County Auditor/Controller for injunctive and
declaratory relief in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County.
PG&E asserted that the County could not bring causes of action under federal
antitrust laws or the Cartwright Act because the alleged violations and injuries
occurred outside the County's "primary" boundaries. PG&E recognized that
individual plaintiffs may bring class actions for injuries caused by violations of
antitrust laws, but it asserted that only the Attorney General possesses the authority
to sue on behalf of a county for violations that take place primarily outside that
county.
The County filed a demurrer in response to the complaint and the trial court
sustained the demurrer on the grounds that PG&E "failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action." Citing subdivisions (a) and (b) of Business &
Professions Code, section 16750, the court of appeal affirmed the lower court's
decision and held that the County had the authority to bring a class action suit for
antitrust violations under the state's Cartwright Act. The Supreme Court of
California granted a review to consider whether the County lacked the authority to
bring causes of action under either the state or federal antitrust laws. However, on
January 16, 1996, the federal district court dismissed the County's class action for

reasons unrelated to the present dispute. While this decision renders the action for
injunctive relief moot, the CA Supreme Court asserted that the request for
declaratory relief and a public interest in the adjudication of the related issues
validated the court's review of the present appeal.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the decision of the court of
appeal and held that Business & Professions Code sections 16750(a) and (b),
which govern a person's right to recover treble damages for injuries resulting from
violations of the Cartwright Act, authorize counties to sue- and prosecute
Cartwright Act antitrust actions. The court further held that a county may sue
under federal antitrust laws. The court cited legislative authority and stated that
counties have been given corporate powers which include the right to sue and be
sued, thereby allowing a county to seek damages for injuries sustained.
PG&E contended that only the state Attorney General could bring a lawsuit
on Stanislaus County's behalf. However, the court interpreted the statute
differently. The court referred to section 16750(a), which provides that any person
who is injured by conduct prohibited by the Cartwright Act may sue for treble
damages and injunctive relief. Section 16750(b) defines a "person" to include the
state and "any of its political subdivisions and public agencies." Therefore, the
court concluded that because the County is a political subdivision of the state of
California, under the authority of its board of supervisors, it may bring an action
under the Cartwright Act. PG&E claimed that an antitrust class action may only
be brought if the Attorney General brings an action on behalf of the County, or that
the district attorney is authorized to bring suit if the effects of the alleged improper
violations occur "primarily" within the boarders of the county. In this case,
however, county council brought the action.
The court rejected PG&E's assertions. While sections 16750(c) and (g) give
the attorney general and the district attorney the power to sue on behalf of a county,
the section does not prohibit a county or political subdivision from suing on its
own behalf. The court clarified that subdivisions (c) and (g) did not set forth
restraints, but merely "establish[ed] additional avenues for pursuing Cartwright
claims."
PG&E also argued that even if section 16750 does not explicitly prohibit the
County from suing under the Cartwright Act, the effects of the alleged illegalities
did not occur "primarily" within the County's borders, and therefore to allow the
County to bring suit would be adverse to the legislative intent. The court reiterated
that the plain meaning of the statute, which is the strongest indicator of legislative
intent, supported the court's finding. However, the court reviewed the legislative
history to ascertain whether the legislature intended to restrict a county's authority
to bring suit under the Cartwright Act.
The court found no such intent. At its inception in 1941, the Cartwright Act
provided that "any person" injured by a violation could sue for damages.
Subsequent amendments to the statute broadened the meaning of a "person" to
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political subdivisions and public agencies, the Attorney General, and the district
attorney. The court reiterated that there was nothing in the language of these
amendments that sought to abrogate the role of local government in bringing
antitrust actions under the Cartwright Act. The court further rejected PG&E's
contention that granting authority to district attorneys to sue on behalf of counties,
cities, and other political subdivisions through subdivision (g) was evidence that
counties could not sue on their own behalf. The court, however, explained that
while the initial construction of the statute authorized a county to sue under the
Cartwright Act, a district attorney could not sue on behalf of counties. Therefore,
subdivision (g) acts not as evidence of a restriction on local government but as an
expansion of the role of district attorneys.
Finally, the court pronounced that in accordance with California law, the
County had the capacity to allege federal antitrust laws. The court noted that the
California Constitution gave the legislature the authority to determine the power
of the counties. Accordingly, the legislature has vested "corporate powers" in
counties, which include the "right to sue and be sued." Therefore, the County had
the same powers as corporations and could sue for violations of the federal antitrust
laws in addition to the ability to sue for violations of state antitrust laws.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1(b) (establishing that the state legislature shall provide the
power of the counties).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 1997) (establishing the parties that can
sue pursuant to Cartwright Act antitrust violations).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (West 1997) (empowering counties and other
governmental entities with the capacity to sue and to bring Cartwright Act antitrust
actions just as any other "person").
CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 23000, 23004(a) (West 1988) (granting counties corporate
powers, including the right to sue and be sued).
Case Law:
California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal.
4th 627, 927 P.2d 1175, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (1997) (pronouncing that "both the

legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its
enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.").
County of Marin v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 2d 633, 349 P.2d 526, 2 Cal. Rptr. 758
(1960) (recognizing a county as a political subdivision of the state with entitlement
only to exercise state granted powers).
People ex rel. Freitas v. City and County of San Francisco, 92 Cal. App. 3d 913,
155 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1979) (asserting that the legislature is clear in authorizing a
state or any of its political subdivisions to sue under the Cartwright Act).
Legal Texts:
44 CAL. JUR. 3D Monopolies §§ 30-38 (1978 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
the Cartwright Act and the principles which determine violations).
58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 86 (1980 & Supp. 1998) (explaining the power of the
courts relating to the interpretation of statutes).
58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 88 (1980 & Supp. 1998) (empowering the highest court
in the state to revise a previously held interpretation of a statute).
1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 576 (discussing the
scope of conduct which violates the Cartwright Act).
1 B.E. W1TKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 577 (discussing
whether a municipality can sue under the Cartwright Act).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Christopher M. Brown and Nikhil S. Singhvi, Antitrust Violations, 35 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 467 (1998) (outlining the elements of violations under section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
Ernest I. Reveal, III and Robert J.Terry, Living with Competition: an Overview of
Antitrust, PredatoryPricing, Competitive Access, Unfair Competition, Mergers
and Overbuilds, 509 PLI/PAT 629 (1998) (generally discussing antitrust laws and
recent trends in this area).
Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing the
role of the courts and judges in the interpretation of statutes and constitutions from
Justice Brennan's perspective).
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Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical
Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1001 (1991) ("tracing the history of judicial reliance on
extrinsic evidence for the determination of legislative intent and constitutional
meaning").
Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387
(1995) (discussing the issues regarding the viability of state claims and reinforcing
the precept that people hold constitutional rights, not the government).

SYDNEY FOHRMAN

IX.

NEGLIGENCE
A participant in an active sport owes a duty to fellow participants not to injure
them intentionally or to act recklessly; even if a local ordinance could heighten
the duty of care established by common law, a county safety ordinance which
encompasses the common law assumption of risk doctrine does not modify the
general test for breach of legal duty by a participant in an active sport.
Cheong v. Antablin, Supreme Court of California,DecidedNovember 24, 1997, 16
Cal. 4th 1063, 946 P.2d 817, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859.

Facts. The plaintiff, Wilkie Cheong, and the defendant, Drew R. Antablin, friends
and law partners, skied together at Alpine Meadows, a resort near Tahoe City in
Placer County. While skiing, the defendant turned to his right in an effort to slow
down and collided with the plaintiff. The Skier Responsibility Code of Placer
County provides in part: "Any individual or group of individuals who engage in the
sport of skiing of any type ... shall assume and accept the inherent risks of such
activities insofar as the risks are reasonably obvious, foreseeable or necessary to
the activities." The code also places a duty on skiers to ski in a "safe and
reasonable manner."
The plaintiff sued the defendant for general negligence. The superior court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, noting that a collision is an
inherent risk of downhill skiing, and therefore the plaintiff assumed the risk under
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992). The
superior court further noted that the Placer County ordinance placed a duty on
skiers to ski in a safe and reasonable manner, but did not give the plaintiff a valid
cause of action. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that the assumption of risk
doctrine applies to individual sports such as skiing, and concluding that the Placer
ordinance did not impose a duty upon skiers, irrespective of Knight. The Supreme
Court of California granted the plaintiff's petition to review the issue of the effect
of the ordinance.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that primary assumption of the risk barred the plaintiff s action because
collisions are an inherent risk of downhill skiing, and even if a local ordinance
could modify common law principles to place a higher duty upon the defendant,
the ordinance at issue evinced no clear intent to so modify assumption of risk
principles. The ordinance preserved common law principles of assumption of risk,
and therefore the ordinance, by itself, did not give the plaintiff a cause of action.
The general rule that persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to
others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another, does not
apply to participants in a sport in which dangerous conditions are an integral part
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of the sport itself. In some sports or activities, careless conduct of others is an
inherent risk of the sport, thus barring recovery by a plaintiff. A skier's duty of
care to other skiers comes within the test formulated by the court in Knight for
breach of legal duty by a participant in an active sport. A legal duty is only
breached by a participant if the injury is the result of intentional conduct, or of
conduct so reckless to be outside the ordinary activity.
The Placer ordinance did not impose a higher duty upon skier defendants than
the duty established by Knight. The Placer ordinance includes the doctrine of
assumption of risk by providing that a skier "shall assume and accept the inherent
risks of such activities insofar as the risks are reasonably obvious, foreseeable or
necessary to the activities," defining inherent risks as including "collision with
other skier's and a skier's failure to ski within the skier's own ability." The
ordinance evinced no clear intent to modify common law assumption of risk
principles: although it states various "skier duties," these duties do not govern tort
liability between skiers. Because the ordinance itself incorporates the doctrine of
assumption of risk, it does not modify the general standard for legal duty as set
forth in Knight. Therefore, even if the defendant's act had violated the Skier
Responsibility Code, the violation would not create tort liability between skiers.
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action under Evidence
Code section 669, subdivision (a)(4): "The failure of a person to exercise due care
is presumed if the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or
regulation was adopted." Because the ordinance clearly states that skiers assume
the inherent risks of skiing, including the risk of collision and of other skiers not
skiing within their own ability, the plaintiff was not "one of the class of persons for
whose protection the.., ordinance... was adopted" under section 669(a).
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. GOVT. CODE § 831.7 (West 1998) (declaring that no public entity nor
employee is liable to any person who participates in a hazardous recreational
activity, and defining "hazardous recreational activity" as including cross-country
and downhill skiing).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1998) ("Every one is responsible, not only for the
result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far
as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon
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himself.").

Case Law:
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994) ("the federal question
for what constitutes negligence for purposes of [federal legislative acts] turns upon
common-law principles, subject to such modifications as Congress has imported
into these principles in the statute itself.").
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) (distinguishing between
common law duty of care of defendant and high standard of duty of care set by
FELA; where the employer's conduct falls short of the high standard required of
him by this Act, liability ensues because the employer owes the duty of complying
with his statutory obligations).
Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992) (holding
that the general rule limiting duty of care of a coparticipant in active sports to avoid
intentional or reckless misconduct applied to participants engaged in noncompetitive but active sports).
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992) (holding
that the determination of whether assumption of risk bars recovery depends on
whether a particular defendant owed a duty to the injured plaintiff, not on whether
the plaintiff acted reasonably in encountering a known risk).
Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 39 Cal. App. 4th 8, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
855 (1995) (discussing assumption of risk in snow skiing and duties of defendant
ski resort).
Legal Texts:
46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 99 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing when
assumption of risk is a good defense to an action based on violation of a safety
law).
46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 110 (1985 & Supp. 1998) ("Whether statute or other
enactment formulates a standard of conduct to be applied in determining whether
the defendant was negligent in violating the enactment is a question of law for the
court.").
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6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts-Sports or Recreation §
1090 (9th ed. Supp. 1998) (discussing the general principles of a defendant's duty
of care to a plaintiff when there are inherent risks in an active sport).
6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 756 (9th ed. Supp. 1998)
(discussing the duty of care owed by the defendant in connection with safety
regulations).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
James H. Chalat, ColoradoSki Law, 27-FEB COLO. LAW. 5 (1998) (analyzing the
realities of legislation and assumption of risk doctrine as they apply to ski cases).
Scott Geisler, Comment, The Uncertain Future of Assumption of Risk in
California,28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495 (1995) (criticizing the current analysis of
primary and secondary assumption of risk, and noting the importance of
determining the inherent risks in the relevant activity under these standards).
John Bianco, Note and Comment, The Dawn of a New Standard? Assumption of
Risk in a Post-KnightCalifornia,15 WHITriERL. REV. 1155 (1994) (analyzing the
effect of Knight upon decisions of whether to impose legal liability for conduct in
competitive sports and the focus upon whether the defendant's conduct breached
a legal duty of care).
Charles J. Sanders and Jacqueline Gayner, Comment, The Cold Truth: Have
Attorneys Really Chilled the Ski Industry?, 2 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL.
PROP. L.F. 125 (1992) (discussing the "blizzard" of legal activity around the ski
industry, highlighting statutes enacted by twenty-four states that enumerate
respective duties and risks of skiers).
Colleen McCaffery, Comment, Skiers Find the "FallLine" in Challenging the
ConstitutionalityofModern Ski Legislation, 1SETONHALL J. SPORTL. 269 (1991)
(analyzing the nature, extent, and purpose of legislative enactments which concern
various forms of ski safety, and discussing the constitutionality of such enactments).

Arthur N. Frakt and Janna S. Rankin, Comment, Surveying the Slippery Slope: The
Questionable Value of Legislation to Limit Ski Area Liability, 28 IDAHO L. REV.
227 (1991-92) (discussing legislation against ski liability and whether it is
necessary when court and juries are not sympathetic to injured skiers).

STEFANIE EVANS
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X. PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
County board of retirement must recalculate final compensation for pension
purposes under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937. In addition to
base salary, final compensation includes the following: longevity incentive
bonuses, cash in lieu of accrued vacation, bilingual premium pay, pay for
employees acting as field training officers and educational incentive pay.
Compensation earnable for the purposes of final compensation does not include
overtime pay or county contributions to deferred compensation plans.
Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Board of Retirement of Ventura County
Employee's Retirement Ass'n, Supreme Court of California, Decided August 14,

1997, 16 Cal. 4th 483, 940 P.2d 891, 66 Cal. Rptr. 304.
Facts. California Government Code section 31450 et seq., titled the County
Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL), establishes the system for the
payment of retirement benefits to county employees. Under CERL, retirement
benefits are based on a calculation of the final compensation of county employees
over a selected period of time. In Ventura County, the period of time used for the
computation of final compensation is one year, and final compensation is defined
as the amount of compensation eamable by an employee during that year. The
amount of compensation eamable by an employee is computed on the basis of the
average compensation earned by an employee in the same class who is employed
for the same number of days during the same period and at the same rate of pay.
For the purposes of CERL, compensation includes cash payments from county
funds, plus any amount deducted for participation in a compensation plan.
However, the Act states that compensation does not include other advantages
afforded to county employees including board, lodging, fuel, or laundry.
The plaintiffs in this case were three retiring members of the Ventura County
Deputy Sheriffs' Department and their employee's association. In addition to basic
annual salary, the plaintiffs earned several other types of benefits and wages over
the course of the year. The members of the sheriffs' association were awarded
cash payments for bilingual premium pay, uniform maintenance, educational
incentives, meal periods, motorcycle bonuses, holiday pay, field training, longevity
incentives, cash in lieu of annual leave and matching deferred compensation
payments. The Board of Retirement of Ventura County Employees' Retirement
Association did not include these ancillary benefits in computing the final
compensation of the retiring sheriffs.
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The deputy sheriffs initiated a mandamus proceeding in order to compel the
board to recalculate the compensation earnable under the statute to include the
additional cash premiums. The trial court denied the writ without comment. The
court of appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court to deny the writ with respect
to the additional premiums related to the ancillary cash payments, but reversed the
decision with respect to the deferred compensation payments. It then directed the
trial court to issue a writ of mandate for the board to recalculate the final
compensation to include the matching deferred compensation benefits. The
California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the various payments
made by the county over and above the basic annual salary were to be included in
the calculation of the final compensation of the county employees for the purpose
of determining the amount of the employees' pension.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the contributions to the deferred benefit plan were not compensation under CERL, but that the other disputed premiums were to be included in the
computation of final compensation. The court held that the additional premiums
were compensation earnable by an employee of the same class and base pay over
the same period of time.
CERL prohibits the use of remuneration in the form of board, lodging or other
advantages to be used in the calculation of compensation for pension purposes. In
this case, county sheriffs were paid for scheduled meal periods, uniform
maintenance, educational incentives, pay in lieu of leave and cash in exchange for
other advantages. This form of remuneration is not excluded by the statute because
the statute specifically excludes only non-cash benefits from being described as
compensation. In this case, the ancillary premiums were in the form of payment
for services rendered and therefore should have been included in the board of
retirement's calculation of compensation.
In arriving at this decision, the court disapproved the previous case law on this
subject, Guelfi v. MarinCounty Employees' RetirementAssociation,145 Cal. App.
3d 297, 193 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1983). In Guelf, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
held that cash payments in the form of educational incentives, overtime pay, and
uniform allowances for police officers did not constitute compensation. The circuit
court held that these types of remunerations were the other types of advantages
excluded by CERL. Additionally, that court held that an item of compensation
must be received by all employees of a certain class in order to be earnable in the
calculation of the pension. Because only certain officers qualified for educational
incentives, overtime pay, and uniform allowances, these items were not earnable
compensation.
The supreme court disapproved of this decision, stating that nothing in the
wording of CERL requires that every member of a certain class receive a certain
type of compensation in order for it to be considered earnable. Because the statute
requires that a retirement board calculate the average wage of an employee in the
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same class, it can be inferred that the legislature foresaw that employees in the
same class would be earning different amounts while working the same number of
hours at the same pay rate. Although not every county employee at the same pay
rate earns the same premiums, every employee has an opportunity to earn
additional cash benefits over base salary. The legislative intent of this statute was
merely to exclude overtime pay as that which qualifies as a different pay rate.
In addition to overtime pay, the county contributions to the deferred
compensation plans of specific employees were also not compensation under
CERL. The Act specifically defines compensation to include any amount deducted
from a county employee's wages for participation in a deferred compensation plan.
In this case, the matching deferred compensation benefits paid to the deputy
sheriffs by the county were made in addition to base salary. The county contributions to the deferred compensation plan were not deductions from base pay. These
payments, therefore, are not compensation to be included in the calculation of final
compensation for the purposes of a pension.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31450 (West 1998) (County Employees Retirement Law of
1937).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31460 (West 1998) (defining compensation as the remuneration paid to an employee plus any amount deducted for a deferred compensation
plan, but not including additional non-cash advantages).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31461 (West 1998) (defining comlensation earnable as the
average compensation earned by an employee in the same class, over the same
period and at the same pay rate).
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 31462 (West 1998) (defining final compensation as the
average compensation earnable by a member over a select period of time).
Case Law:
Guelfi v. Main County Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 145 Cal. App. 3d 297, 193
Cal. Rptr. 343 (1983), disapprovedby Ventura County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v.
Board of Retirement of Ventura County Employee's Retirement Ass'n, 16 Cal. 4th
483, 940 P.2d 891, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304 (1998).
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Hudson v. Board of Admin. of the Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 59 Cal.
App. 4th 1310, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737 (1997) (excluding benefits resulting from a
conversion to a new pension system to be included as compensation for pension
purposes).
Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889) (describing a pension fund for San Francisco
police officers as entirely at the disposal of the state until vested in the officers and,
as such, entirely revokable).
Rose v. City of Hayward, 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 179 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1981) (stating
that uniform allowance and holiday pay for police officers and fire fighters was to
be included in compensation from which pension was to be computed).
Legal Texts:
60 AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1697 (1988 & Supp. 1997)
(noting that retired policemen are an ascertainable class with respect to the
computation of pension benefits and, as such, the question of what should be
included as compensation is suitable for class action disposition).
60 AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1698 (1988 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing uniform allowances in the calculation of pension benefits).
60 AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1702 (1988 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing the use of educational incentives, deferred pay increases, and other
premiums used in the calculation of compensation for pension purposes).
49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement Systems §§ 4, 5 (1979 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing public retirement and pension systems).
49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement Systems § 6 (1979 & Supp. 1998)
(describing statutes governing police officer pension funds).
49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement Systems § 38 (1979 & Supp. 1998)
(explaining the mandamus proceeding pursuant to a board decision concerning
public employee's pension award).
2 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 340

(9th ed. 1987) (discussing the state of California law as it relates to pension, health,
and welfare funds).
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
Andrew MacKenzie, Note, Spiller v. State: Determining the Nature of Public
Employees'Rights to Their Pensions,46 ME. L. REV. 355, 358 (1994) (reviewing
a recent Maine Supreme Court decision in relation to current law in the United
States).
Deborah Kemp, Public Pension Plans: The Need for Federal Regulation, 10
HAMLINE L. REV. 27 (1987) (calling for Pennie v. Reis to be overturned).
Terry C. Copps, Comment, Pensions: Public Employee Plans as Contractual
Obligations Granted Constitutional Protection, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 169, 171
(1980) (noting that the current trend is for courts to protect the expectations of
public pension plan members).

ANDREW BRANIFF
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XI. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In a case involving asbestos-related cancer, a plaintiff may prove causation by
proving that, within a reasonable medical probability, the asbestos manufactured by the defendant was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiffs
risk of developing cancer. Furthermore, a burden shifting jury instruction,
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant manufacturer, is unnecessary in
complex asbestos litigation absent a showing of necessity for application of
alternative liability.
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Supreme Court of California,Decided August
28, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 953, 941 P.2d 1203, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16.

Facts. In January of 1988, after he had worked at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard
for forty years, Charles Rutherford filed an asbestos related claim in the Superior
Court of Solano County. In his original complaint, which named Owens-Illinois
and eighteen other asbestos manufacturers as defendants, Rutherford alleged that
he had contracted lung cancer during his employment at Mare Island due to his
continual exposure to the defendants asbestos products. In April 1988, Rutherford
died of lung cancer and the complaint was amended to include a wrongful death
action brought by the decedent's wife and daughter.
At trial, the Rutherfords' action was consolidated with four other similar
asbestos claims, and the case was split into damages and liability phases. During
the first, or proximate cause phase, evidence was presented that exhibited the
extent of Rutherford's contact with the defendant's asbestos. Notwithstanding the
fact that he was never an installer of asbestos, Rutherford was exposed to airborne
asbestos dust on a daily basis. Also, evidence was presented at trial of
Rutherford's 1947 to 1977 pack-a-day smoking habit. Nevertheless, the jury
found Rutherford's inhalation of asbestos fibers the proximately caused his lung
cancer,'and awarded the plaintiffs over one half of a million dollars in damages.
The defendants did not challenge this portion of the jury's verdict.
At the second, or liability phase of trial, the plaintiffs chose to follow the
burden-shifting instruction, which was a part of the court's adopted procedures for
complex asbestos litigation. The instruction specifically stated that after the
plaintiff s have proven the defectiveness of the product, as well as proximate cause,
the defendant manufacturer has the burden to prove that its asbestos was not a
proximate cause of the decedent's injuries or death. Testimony of two of the
decedent's coworkers was introduced to illustrate the exposure to the defendants'
products. Similarly, medical testimony was introduced to demonstrate the
increasing risk of developing lung cancer when there is an increase in the number
of asbestos fibers that are inhaled. In sum, it was shown that the asbestos exposure
incurred by the decedent was a result of his occupation at Mare Island.
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The court allowed the defendant to introduce evidence tending to show the
comparative fault of other asbestos manufacturers, as well as evidence that
illustrated the decedent's contributory negligence as a result of his thirty year
smoking habit. The trial court instructed the jury that it must reduce the plaintiffs
award accordingly. In addition, the defendants attempted to utilize a tobacco
company defense, whereby manufacturers of cigarettes would share liability for a
plaintiff s injuries due to the damaging products with which they supplied to the
decedent. However, the trial court ruled against the defendants applying this
specific defense. At the end of this phase of the trial, the jury was instructed to
assign percentages of fault, and the Rutherford plaintiffs recovered roughly
$180,000 from Owens-Illinois.
The court of appeal concluded that the trial court committed prejudicial error
in rejecting the defendants use of a tobacco company defense. Furthermore, the
court of appeal ruled that it was error to instruct the jury to shift the burden to the
defendant. The Supreme Court of California granted the plaintiffs petition for
review based on the tobacco company defense and the burden-shifting issues.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the Supreme Court of
California ruled that the tobacco company defense should not have been allowed.
The court also determined that the Rutherford plaintiffs should not have been
afforded the burden-shifting instruction, but that this instruction did not subject the
defendant to prejudicial error.
Citing a lack of guidance on the burden-shifting issue, the court specified that
the Rutherford case would serve as the principal case regarding the burden-shifting
issue. The court determined that plaintiffs in complex asbestos litigation could
prove causation without utilizing a burden-shifting mechanism found largely in
cases involving "alternative liability." To illustrate this point, the court found that
plaintiffs in a products liability action need only prove that the defective products
manufactured by the defendant were a substantial factor contributing to the
plaintiff's injuries.
Citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), the court held that
a burden shifting analysis would only be available on a showing of necessity for
alternative liability. This theory states that when a plaintiff is injured by two or
more defendants, and it is proven that only one of the defendants could have
caused the harm, the burden shifts to each defendant to demonstrate that he is not
liable for the harm. In the instant case, the plaintiff would have been unable to
prove the company responsible for the decedent's harm with specificity, given the
unique properties of asbestos manufactured by different companies. Therefore,
due to uncertainty and the potential for excluding the actual tortfeasor from
liability, the court held that the theory of alternative liability was not applicable.
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The court then focused on the medical uncertainty regarding the formation of
cancer cells in the decedent as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Plaintiffs in an
asbestos-related cancer case cannot be expected to determine, through complicated
tracing methods, the exact source of the cancer causing asbestos. However, as the
court held, this fact does not mandate utilization of the burden-shifting method. In
this instance, the plaintiff may prove, within a reasonable medical probability, that
the defendant's defective product was the substantial factor in causing the disease.
Therefore, absent an essential need for shifting of the burden-as in cases involving
alternative liability-the court held that the burden should remain with the plaintiff.
However, the court determined that the burden-shifting instruction was not a
prejudicial error. The defendant could thus not obtain a reversal on this fact.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1431 (West Supp. 1999) (discussing joint and several liability
for defendant manufacturers of asbestos).
CAL. LABOR CODE § 4408 (West 1989) (explaining the procedure for bringing

asbestos claims that allege liability against an employer).
Case Law:
Souder v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 939 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that the doctrine of alternative liability was not available in an action
against asbestos manufacturers).
Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1282, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335
(1995) (defining reasonable medical probability in relation to an asbestos claim and
its application to the substantial factor test).
Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Coming Corp., 935 P.2d 684 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(discussing an asbestos claim and subsequent procedural analysis when a claim
involves multiple manufacturers).
Legal Texts:
50 CAL. JUR. 3D Products Liability § 7 (1993) (explaining negligence theory of
products liability).
50 CAL. JUR. 3D ProductsLiability § 19 (1993) (discussing elements of a products
liability cause of action).
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65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 226 (1981) (explaining general
claims brought by asbestos workers).
2 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Use of Asbestos § 325 (9th ed.
1987) (discussing the rise of asbestos litigation prompting 1978 reform).
6 B.E. WTKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, SubstantialFactor Instruction
Approved § 968A (9th ed. Supp. 1997) (explaining the application of the
substantial factor test).
6 B.EWTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Distinction:Asbestos § 1278A (9th
ed. Supp. 1997) (discussing principles regarding unidentified manufacturers'
liability).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Gerald W. Boston, Apportionmentof Harmin Tort Law: A ProposedRestatement,
21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996) (discussing the determination of liability when
multiple factors contribute to the harm).
Ian Gallacher, Hazardous Substance Litigation: Theories of Recovery and Proof
of Causation, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 423 (1997) (illustrating
decisions that have applied the substantial factor test).
Alan J. Lazarous et. al., Recent Developments in Products, GeneralLiability, and
Consumer Law, 32 TORT. & INS. L.J. 499 (1997) (discussing substantial factor
theory and its application).
Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: Causationand!Risk ContributionModel,
25 ENVTL. L. 549 (1995) (explaining different theories under which fault can be
distributed in asbestos litigation).

Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The ThresholdLevel ofProofofAsbestos Causation:
The "Frequency,Regularityand Proximity Test" and a Modified Summers v. Tice
Theory of Burden Shifting, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 735 (1995) (documenting the
increase and history of asbestos litigation, the development of causation, the recent
developments in asbestos litigation, and a critical analysis of the different theories
of causation).

COLIN BATCHELOR

252

[Vol. 26: 169, 1998]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

XI. TORTS
For purposes of prospectively apply Proposition 51, a cause of action for
damages resulting from a latent or progressive disease accrues at the time of
diagnosis or discovery of the disease.
Buttram v. Owens-CorningFiberglasCorp., Supreme Courtof California,Decided
August 18, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 520, 941 P.2d 71, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438.

Facts. California Civil Code section 1431.2, commonly referred to as Proposition
51, limits non-economic damages in torts cases to the proportion of the tortfeasor' s
fault. Proposition 51 applies prospectively to claims which have accrued after its
enactment on June 4, 1986. It does not apply retroactively to claims which have
accrued prior to that date. Proposition 51 overrides the common law principle of
joint and several liability in the non-economic damages context, eliminating
plaintiffs search for the "deep pocket" and alleviating perceived economic
consequences of such a law. The result of the rule is that tortfeasors are not left to
bear the brunt of liability for non-economic damages in cases where they are only
partially at fault. Proposition 51 is legislation designed to encourage fairness and
justice.
The plaintiff, James Buttram, brought a products liability action against
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation, an asbestos manufacturer, after developing
an asbestos-related lung cancer due to exposure to the company's products.
Buttram was exposed to asbestos while working in the boiler room on a Navy ship
between 1964 and 1968. Based on expert testimony, the trial court found that the
plaintiff s cancer cells had developed prior to the enactment of Proposition 51, but
had gone undetected until 1991 when Buttram was diagnosed with the disease.
A jury awarded Buttram $450,000 in non-economic damages and found the
defendant to be twenty-eight percent at fault for the injuries. At the behest of the
parties' post-trial cross-motions, the trial court held that Buttram's cause of action
accrued at the time of cancer cell formation, and Proposition 51 was therefore
inapplicable. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the proper test for
determining claim accrual under Proposition 51 was the instance of "appreciable
harm." The development of Buttram's first cancer cells, in the opinion of the court,
constituted "appreciable harm" and triggered the accrual of his cause of action.
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider when a cause of action
for damages accrues in cases involving latent diseases for the purpose of applying
Proposition 51 prospectively.
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Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that
for purposes of Proposition 51 applicability, a cause of action for damages
resulting from latent or progressive diseases accrues at the time of diagnosis or
discovery of the disease.
After surveying the difficulties inherent in determining cause of action accrual
in latent disease cases, the supreme court noted that the date may vary depending
on the context in which it is to be applied. However, for purposes of Proposition
51, the policies behind the initiative and the rationale for applying prospective
effect to the tort reform supports the "discovery" rule articulated by the court. In
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188,753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1988), the court held that Proposition 51 applied prospectively to causes of action
accruing after its enactment. The court asserted that the rationales underlying the
holding in Evangelatos supported its holding in the case at bar.
The court expressed concern that it would be "unfair to change 'the rules of
the game' in the middle of the contest." A party's reasonable reliance on existing
laws at the time of claim accrual determines who it will join in the lawsuit and with
whom it will settle. In many instances, statutes of limitation may have run on
absent tortfeasors not joined in the action. Tort victims are thus partially left
without a remedy. Furthermore, settlement agreements for a lesser amount may
be drawn to reflect reliance on the current state of the law. Reasonable reliance is
absent for the plaintiff with a latent disease. Until the disease is diagnosed or
otherwise discovered by the patient, she has no legal claim for non-economic
damages which include pain and suffering and the like. Without discovering the
actual harm, the court reasoned, there is no contemplation of litigation or its
various components, including targeting defendants or constructing settlements.
In short, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in such cases have formed
expectations. Additionally, accrual of claims arising from injuries sustained by
latent diseases will always have to be proven by backwards-looking medical
testimony. At best, the testimony will be speculative regarding when the disease
first manifested itself.
In fashioning its holding, the court was careful to note the limited context to
which the rule applies. The law was not designed to permit defendants to escape
liability, but was to effectuate the policy and fairness concerns surrounding
Proposition 51 and the prospective effect the court has assigned to the statute.
Furthermore, in rejecting the court of appeal's "appreciable harm" test, the court
related that such a test would thwart the objectives of Proposition 51 "well into the
21st century" due to the latency period of certain diseases.
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL.

CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1998) (noting the purpose behind

Proposition 51).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1998) ("Each defendant shall be liable only

for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to... percentage of fault .....
Case Law:
Evangelatos v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1988) (requiring prospective effect of Proposition 51).
Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 56 Cal. App. 4th 618,65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (1997)
(noting that Proposition 51 applies only in cases of comparative fault, not vicarious
liability).
Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992) (finding that an asbestos claim
accrued during continuous exposure to the product and as a result, the law existing
at the time of that exposure was to be applied).
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d 47 (Md. 1992) (holding that
prospective application of a statutory limit on non-economic damages did not
encompass those with latent diseases although they were diagnosed after the
effective date of legislation).
Legal Texts:
14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contribution and Indemnification § 84 (1978 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing comparative fault principles).
43 CAL. JUR. 3D Limitation of Actions § 72 (1978 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
statute of limitations in personal injury cases).
5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 51 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1998) (discussing Proposition 51 generally).
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7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OFCALIFORNIALAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 496 (9th ed.
1988) (elaborating on the prospective effect of Proposition 51).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Barbara A. Allen et al., California'sProposition51: Ambiguities inApportionment
and the Impact on FederalInterpleaderand Intra-State Settlement, 12 WHITTIER
L. REv. 273 (1991) (discussing implications of Proposition 51).
Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation,76 CALIF. L. REV. 965 (1988) (advocating the elimination of statutes of
limitation and repose in toxic tort cases generally).
Ellyn Moscowitz, The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986: How Fair Is It?, 13
WHITrTER L. REv. 909 (1992) (exploring emerging issues under Proposition 51).
Robert N. Pafundi, Proposition51 Takes Hold: New ProblemsEmergefor Partial
Settlements in Multi-TortfeasorLitigation,10 CAL. LAW. 48 (1990) (explaining the
effect of Proposition 51 on settlements).
Scott S. Shepardson, Note, Buttram v. Owens-Corning FiberglasCorp.:A Cruel
Accrual Rule?, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 459 (1998) (providing extensive analysis of the

case).
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XIII. TRUSTS
The power to assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to confidential
communications between a predecessor trustee and its attorney on matters
concerning trust administration passes from the predecessor trustee to its
successor upon the successor's assumption of the office of trustee.
Moeller v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of California, Decided December 4,
1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1124, 947 P.2d 279, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317.

Facts. Sanwa Bank (Sanwa) was trustee to a trust established by George Moeller.
Among the beneficiaries to the trust was Moeller's son, petitioner Roger Moeller
(Moeller). Sanwa resigned as trustee and Moeller succeeded to that position.
Upon its resignation, Sanwa petitioned for settlement and sought to recover from
the trust expenses Sanwa had incurred in the clean up of the trust property, a
trustee's fee, and attorney's fees. Moeller objected to the petition on several
grounds, namely that the accounting contained errors and omissions, and that
certain expenditures and advances had resulted from imprudent decisions by
Sanwa. Moeller demanded production and inspection of certain documents related
to Sanwa's administration of the trust. Sanwa claimed that it had already produced
many documents which Moeller demanded and those documents which Sanwa did
not produce were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Sanwa asserted the
attorney-client privilege as to all the demanded documents except those containing
communications between Sanwa and any governmental agency involving trust
assets.
Moeller moved for an order to compel Sanwa to produce the disputed
documents, claiming that Sanwa could not invoke the attorney-client privilege
because that privilege belonged to the office of the trustee rather than to a
particular person who serves as a trustee. Sanwa argued that the privilege applies
to the trustee personally and not to the trust or the office of the trustee. The trial
court agreed with Sanwa and held that Sanwa properly asserted an attorney-client
privilege which did not transfer to Moeller as successor to Sanwa.
Moeller petitioned the court of appeal to issue a writ of mandate to compel the
trial court to order the production and inspection of the documents and records
which Moeller had demanded. The court of appeal held that Moeller, as a
successor trustee, had the right and duty to compel Sanwa to transfer its trust
records to Moeller, and accordingly issued the writ of mandate. The California
Supreme Court granted Sanwa's petition for review.
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Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeal and held that the power to assert the attorney-client privilege with respect
to confidential communications between a predecessor trustee and its attorney on
matters concerning trust administration passes from the predecessor trustee to its
successor upon the successor's assumption of the office of trustee.
The court first noted that it has been the law in California for over a century
that a new trustee succeeds to all the rights, duties and responsibilities of its
predecessors. Further, the powers conferred upon a trustee can be exercised by its
successors unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust. The power to
assert the attorney-client privilege is one such power which can be exercised by a
successor trustee because the privilege is essential to effective administration of the
trust. As such, the power to assert the privilege passes from the predecessor to its
successor.
The court observed that under such a rule, a trustee must take into account the
possibility that its confidential communications with an attorney about trust
administration may someday be disclosed to a successor trustee. However, such
a possibility is not unfair in light of the nature of a trust and the trustee's duties.
Specifically, the trust relationship places burdens on the trustee because the trustee
has an obligation to manage the trust for the benefit of another.
The court also specifically noted that the successor trustee inherits only the
power to assert the privilege as to those confidential communications that occurred
when the predecessor, in its fiduciary capacity, sought the attorney's advice for
guidance in the administration of the trust. Again, the court observed that although
requiring a trustee to distinguish his or her own attorney-client interests from those
of the beneficiaries may be burdensome and painstaking, such a burden is
consistent with the purpose of a trust. Finally, the court noted that other courts
have concluded that the power to assert the attorney-client privilege passes from
a predecessor officer to a successor in the analogous context of corporate affairs.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16247 (Deering 1991) (stating that trustees have the power to
hire persons, including attorneys, to advise and assist the trustee in the performance
of administrative duties).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16249 (Deering 1991) (stating that a trustee has the power to

prosecute and defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of trust
property and of the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties).
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CAL. PROB. CODE § 16061 (Deering 1991) (stating that trustees shall provide the
beneficiary with a report about the acts of the trustee and administration of the
trust).
Case Law:
Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Weitraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (holding
that when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to
assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well).
Estate of De la Montoya, 83 Cal. App. 2d 322, 188 P.2d 494 (1948) (holding that
powers conferred on a trustee can properly be exercised by his or her successors,
unless otherwise provided by the trust)..
Straus v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 396, 224 P.2d 726 (1950) (holding that trust
property includes a trustee's records regarding the administration of the trust).
Legal Texts:
60 CAL. JuR. 3d Trusts § 150 (1994) (noting that the trustee must administer the
trust according to the trust instrument and Trust Law).
60 CAL. JuR. 3d Trusts § 152 (1994) (noting that the trustee may employ attorneys
to protect and preserve the estate).
60 CAL. JUR. 3d Trusts § 153 (1994) (stating that a professional trustee is held to
a higher standard of care than other trustees).
60 CAL. JuR. 3d Trusts § 155 (1994) (noting that the trustee's records are deemed
part of the trust estate and the beneficiaries have a right to inspect them stemming
from their common interest in the property along with the trustee).
11 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA TRUSTS, HiringPersons (9th ed. 1990) (noting that
the trustee has the power to hire attorneys to assist the trustee in performance of his
or her duties).
11 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA TRUSTS, Actions and Proceedings (9th ed. 1990)
(stating that the trustee has the power to prosecute and defend actions in the
performance of the trustee's duties).
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Law Reviews and Journals:
Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands - Too
Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 563 (1985) (noting trusts are
flexible and trustees of a trust often change).
PamelaJ. Keeler, AdministrationofEstates;Trusts-PrudentInvestorRule, 27 PAC.
L. J. 375 (1996) (noting various administrative duties of trustees).
Review of Selected 1986 CaliforniaLegislation, 18 PAC. L. J. 749 (1986) (noting
various powers and liabilities of trustees).
James R. Mayo, Trust Law: Protectingthe Trustee, CAL. LAWYER, Nov 1997, at
29 (noting that among their many duties, trustees and their attorneys are required
to prepare and deliver trust accountings to beneficiaries).
Rochelle A. Smith, Why Limit A Good Thing? A Proposalto Apply the California
Statute to Revocable Living Trusts, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1391 (1992) (noting that
trustees have various administrative duties in managing a trust).
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